Ukraine's long-range strategy: Tipping the balance in warfare

From what distance can Ukraine attack Russian targets? Aside from the capabilities of the Ukrainian air force, which was quickly either destroyed or forced to limit its activities in the early period of the war, the answer is about 120 kilometres.

Ballistic missiles from the old 9K79 Tochka system could cover that distance. The new Ukrainian weapon, the guided 300-mm rockets of the Vilkha system, also offered a similar range. However, the limited number of Tochkas and Vilkha rockets were quickly exhausted, so their use beyond the early period of the war—though still occurring—is very rare.

The effective enemy strike range became about 40 kilometres. At that distance, the Western 155 mm artillery delivered to Ukraine could fire, including weapons such as Polish Krab howitzers, German PzH 2000, or the French CAESAR (a limited number of Vulcano 155 projectiles can increase the shooting range to up to 80 kilometres).

While the Russians had Smiercz/Tornado-S launchers (at least 90 kilometres), Tochka-U (120 kilometres), and 9K720 Iskander (over 300 kilometres), as well as a full arsenal of naval and aerial cruise missiles, this put the Ukrainian army at a significant disadvantage. The Russians could strike targets on the front line and its immediate rear as well as any location across Ukraine's territory.

An ace up Kyiv's sleeve turned out to be the R-360 Neptune anti-ship system developed just before the war. It offers a range of around 280 kilometres, and it is the Neptune that Ukrainian sources credit with sinking the Russian cruiser "Moskva" (though some experts disagree, pointing to the possibility of using Western weapons).

"Moskva" was sunk about 100 kilometres from the Ukrainian coast, and the R-360 launchers—though very few—became a deterrent, forcing Russian ships to maintain their distance from the shore.

Ukraine also began working on adapting the Neptunes to attack land targets. While they have announced this possibility since 2023, the number of disclosed attacks using this weapon remains small. The R-360 Neptune was likely used to attack Russian anti-air systems in Crimea in September 2024.

A significant change occurred when the HIMARS launchers were delivered to Ukraine mid-2022. Thanks to unexpected strikes using GMLRS rockets with a range of about 80 kilometres, Ukrainians successfully targeted Russian logistics, which relied heavily on railway lines.

Attacks on frontline warehouses forced the Russians to withdraw their logistics beyond the reach of GMLRS, which meant moving reserves of weapons, ammunition, and fuel further away from the battlefield.

The Russians rebuilt their supply chains relatively quickly, but due to the greater distances, they became less efficient, and delivering all necessities to the front began incurring higher costs.

The next breakthrough was providing Ukraine with Western weapons with an even greater range. Ballistic ATACMS missiles, as well as cruise Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, offer—in export versions subject to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—a range of about 300 kilometres, meaning most significant targets in Russia remain unreachable for them.

Thanks to these weapons, Ukraine carried out several spectacular and practical attacks, destroying significant targets like the building of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters and the Crimean Bridge, along with Russian anti-air systems. However, the number of missiles delivered is too small to influence the course of battles significantly; attacks using them allow for the destruction of individual and significant targets and have a major propaganda impact, but they are few.

Moreover, for many months, this weapon could not be used by Ukraine with full discretion—until autumn 2024, there was a ban on attacks on targets within Russia's borders.

A substitute for cruise missiles emerged in the form of various types of drones for Ukraine, such as AN-196 Liuty, UJ-26 Bóbr, or hybrid constructions, like Hell or Palanycia missiles.

This weapon possesses significant propaganda value, enabling attacks on targets deep within enemy territory, even within Moscow. Ukraine's use of such drones prompted Russia to relocate its strategic bombers to distant airports.

Drones, unlike ballistic or cruise missiles, offer relatively limited destructive power. Cruise missiles, like Storm Shadow, for instance, have carefully designed warheads capable of penetrating buildings or shelters and exploding inside, where the impact is particularly devastating.

Meanwhile, most drones carry small warheads; even those with a significant payload are relatively ineffective. This results from the fact that the explosion usually occurs outside the building in drone attacks, leading to facade damage but without disrupting structural elements. If a drone does not hit a particularly sensitive target, like an ammunition depot or fuel storage, the damage is minor and can be repaired easily.

That's why Ukraine has long appealed for the transfer of weapons combining long-range with efficiency, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles. These appeals have so far been met with refusal, but Kyiv isn’t idle and isn't limiting its efforts to pleas for assistance.

Three years of war have given Ukraine time to refine systems like Vilkha, which now offers a range of 300 kilometres. Ukrainians are also progressing on a ballistic missile, Sapsan, and at the end of 2024, Sweden officially declared assistance in developing long-range weapons.

In this context, it's worth noting the FP-5 missile, which the Milanion Group showcased during arms fairs in Abu Dhabi. The missile is simplistic in design, with a pulsejet engine, weighs approximately 6 tonnes, and can carry a 1,000-kilogram warhead over up to 3,000 kilometres. Milanion Group announces its ability to produce 50 such missiles per month.

The presentation of this weapon appears particularly interesting, especially regarding Ukraine. Milanion Group, a company from the United Arab Emirates, supplies Ukraine with, among other things, Agema ground drones and Alacran self-propelled mortars. The FP-5 missile display suggests that it might be the long-range weapon the Ukrainians plan to use shortly.

Regardless of what Ukraine's new long-range weapon will be, its introduction could signify a significant shift in the military balance of power. Even now, with minimal resources, Ukraine can effectively disrupt the Russian petrochemical industry.

Suppose Kyiv truly gains the capacity to attack distant targets with far more powerful weapons. In that case, it will secure a substantial advantage. It will not only be able to target critical points deep inside Russia, but the mere threat of such attacks might force Russia to disperse its air defences further and to position valuable launchers at key facilities across its vast territory.

Meanwhile, Ukraine awaits further deliveries of Western aircraft, trains pilots, and attempts to rebuild its air force capabilities. As Kyiv integrates the new long-range weapons into service, it may become apparent that Russia's effective defence of both its infrastructure and troops on the front line is a challenge exceeding the capabilities of Its air defences.

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