Lukashenko treads carefully: Resisting Putin's call to arms

In June of this year, during a visit to Washington, the leader of the democratic forces in Minsk, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, warned that Lukashenko might once again provide Russia with Belarusian territory to strike Ukraine or the Baltic states. However, she added that she could not imagine the "Belarusian army joining the Russian army, as there are no anti-Ukrainian sentiments in her nation."

What Tsikhanouskaya says is very likely. The Belarusian dictator himself, Alexander Lukashenko, has been reluctant to engage in the war since the conflict began. Although he provided Belarusian bases and training grounds and, in the first year of the war, supplied Russia with over 64,000 long tonnes of ammunition, hundreds of T-72A tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Ural trucks, he did not do it for free. The Kremlin had to forgive part of the debt and increase economic assistance to Belarus.

Lukashenko negotiated tough every time. He knew that Putin was in a tight spot and could lose face without Minsk's help, so he squeezed every possible bit out of the situation.

Currently, the Kremlin is purchasing optical instruments, aiming systems, electronic equipment, fire control systems, specialised wheeled vehicles, and more from Belarusian factories. The Russians have invested significant resources in developing the Belarusian industry and now benefit from the full range of services of the local military-industrial complex.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, 120 Belarusian factories and design offices are currently producing 1,600 types of equipment and gear for the Russian army. Meanwhile, 940 Russian enterprises supply around 4,000 types of goods to 67 Belarusian military enterprises.

For example, the 558th Aircraft Repair Plant in Baranovichi has become a key repair centre for helicopters from the Mi-8/Mi-17 family after a series of Ukrainian attacks on facilities in Rostov-on-Don. Frontline-damaged machines are transferred to the safe facilities in Baranovichi, where Ukrainian missiles can't reach them.

At the beginning of last year, a joint Belarusian-Russian command was established, which is, in fact, another department within the Russian Western Military District. Belarusian units are directly subordinate to the Russians in terms of training and, partially, logistics. However, Minsk stipulated that the Russians could not operationally command Belarusian units, meaning they could not use them in combat operations against Ukraine without Minsk's consent.

The Russians are solely responsible for the integrated training system to ensure interoperability between both armies. This situation is reminiscent of the Soviet era, when the Joint Command of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact was merely a façade of pluralism, formally the 14th Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

Due to the joint command, the Russians can freely redeploy their units to Belarusian territory without informing Minsk. In return, equipment and money are sent to Belarus and the soldiers to modernise the neglected Belarusian army. This is the price for providing Belarusian training grounds where the Russians can train without fearing attacks from Ukrainians.

Currently, the Russians do not maintain a permanent ground force contingent in Belarus but rotate units, using Belarus as a training base. The situation is different with aviation, which holds significant forces at the airports in Baranovichi and Minsk, mainly fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. In contrast, airstrikes conducted from Belarusian territory have been reduced to zero.

For Lukashenko, this level of involvement in military operations is entirely sufficient. He is a pragmatist, and for him, reducing debts to the Kremlin, developing his own arms industry, and, above all, ensuring the continuity of power for the Lukashenko clan is more important.

It is almost certain that he will "run" for the presidency in 2025. Sending the army to war in the Kremlin's interests could result in larger riots than those that occurred in August and September 2020. Additionally, if the army were on the front line, he would not have many forces left to suppress these protests.

Moreover, it would expose Belarus to retaliatory attacks from Ukraine, which could destroy the meticulously built arms industry that not only benefits the state but also the ruling clique.

Everything indicates that participating in an attack on Ukraine doesn't pay off for him, and Lukashenko is aware of this. After all, he's been resisting Putin's cajoling for almost three years. Lukashenko knows that Russian calls for Minsk's help are merely the cries of a desperate voice in the wilderness, reflecting the impotence of Russian armed forces in the face of the Ukrainian attack on Kursk Oblast.