Ukraine faces dire challenges as Russian advances persist

The year 2024 ends for Ukraine with significant territorial losses, logistical problems, and ongoing personnel shortages at front-line units. The last three months were especially the worst for the Ukrainian army since the spring of 2022. Quick remedial actions have achieved little: in November, Major General Mykhailo Drapaty became the new Commander of the Land Forces, and a month earlier, a plan was announced to mobilise another 160,000 soldiers to meet the most urgent needs.

Without further radical actions, the situation could worsen. The question is whether the government and citizens are ready for further sacrifices. As the war drags on, with increasing losses and further failures, support for continuing the fight is waning. 2025 could be crucial for the conflict's future in the country's southeastern part. It may end with Russians taking over the entire Donbas.

Since the end of the first year of the war, Ukrainians have suffered from a chronic shortage of human resources. So far, Kyiv has mobilised 4.5% of its citizens and can no longer mobilise a larger percentage of the population. Several factors contribute to this state of affairs.

The most significant is a demographic crisis that has been worsening for years, exacerbated by the outbreak of war. The population in areas controlled by Kyiv has dropped from 38 million to 25-27 million. Formally, Ukraine can mobilise approximately 5 million people. However, to preserve the country's future, men from the age of 25 are being mobilised. Additionally, numerous exclusions apply, further reducing the pool. Therefore, realistically, Kyiv can count on a maximum of 2-2.5 million people, of which 1,050,000 have already been called up.

Improving the situation could involve increasing the draft within Ukraine and bringing back conscription-age men who left the country after the war broke out. Of the nearly 700,000 men who went to Western Europe, about 200,000 met the requirements of the new mobilisation law. However, there is an issue with politicians reluctant to make further calls and citizens who believe the army is squandering soldiers' lives.

After a year-long delay in mobilisation, Ukrainians have formed at least ten new brigades. Six mechanised brigades, three infantry brigades within the Territorial Defence, and one Jaeger unit are mentioned. President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned 14 brigades in August. Hence, in October, the decision was made to call up 160,000 people, allowing staffing up to 85% of the units' personnel.

This is a necessary condition if Kyiv wants to stop Russian aggression. However, even if it were possible to mobilise people, another problem would arise: All brigades lack equipment.

Deciding to mobilise is one thing, but executing it is another. Ukrainians are holding off on implementation because they have nothing to equip the new units. Only four newly formed brigades have dedicated equipment in armoured vehicles, engineering equipment, and artillery. The rest received only lorries, off-road vehicles, and infantry weapons and equipment.

Ukrainians cannot afford to send inadequately equipped and trained soldiers. Personnel losses are significantly more detrimental to them than the Russians, which still rise due to exhaustion and lack of rotation. This, in turn, results in a massive wave of desertion. The newspaper "Financial Times" reported that in just the first ten weeks of this year, more Ukrainian soldiers deserted than in the first two years of the war. The Ukrainian prosecutor's office has launched 60,000 cases against soldiers suspected of desertion. Since these data were published, the situation has likely not improved.

The Ukrainian army has fallen into a vicious circle from which it can only escape with the help of Western allies. President Zelensky plays a major role in this. However, he has lost much of his charisma, which allowed him to mask political mistakes. When the government in Kyiv was still conducting PR activities rather than pure propaganda, it was easier for citizens to accept unpopular decisions, such as restrictions on movement and transitioning the state to wartime modes. Currently, this is no longer accepted with a shrug but with protests.

Zelensky has alienated himself from many people with his lack of understanding of the military, successive dismissals of line officers and staff officers, and by surrounding himself with people who do not robustly challenge the errors being made. In Kyiv, it is said that around the Mariinsky Palace, the president's residence, there is not only a brick wall but a political one that does not allow bad information to penetrate. The president also does not see mistakes in his own actions. This has not gone unnoticed by allies.

For some time now, Zelensky has been perceived as a supplicant, not a discussion partner. Without changing the way negotiations are conducted and policies regarding image, support for aiding Ukraine will diminish, and without adequate backing from politicians and the public, more tanks, armoured vehicles, and ammunition will not reach the East.

This is especially true for the new administration that will take office in the White House in January. It does not understand the nuances of international politics well and will be guided primarily by business language. For example, Donald Trump's recent announcements have made further assistance contingent on financial and economic considerations.

None of the command position changes made by Zelensky have brought the expected results on the front lines. The only visible change was the abandonment of the stubborn defence of cities, from which Ukrainians prefer to withdraw rather than suffer massive losses. The situation is not helped because, in selected front sections where Russians operate, Ukrainians cannot conduct a stable defence based on strong field fortifications. This results from a lack of personnel stretched lines, and earlier neglect in preparing a deep defence: in many places, sections that battalions should occupy are held by companies.

This also complicates the command process. Very often, units or even subunits are detached from brigades and moved to threatened sections of the front. This complicates the command process and logistical problems. This is most evident on the Operational Command-Brigade command line.

It turned out that abandoning the intermediate command level, which is the division, causes problems during a rapidly changing front-line situation and limited combat capabilities. Independent brigades commanded directly by Operational Commands proved excellent during the first 18 months of the war when Ukrainians employed manoeuvre defence.

Ukrainian brigades are larger than those known from other armies. Each is an independent brigade combat team with its own logistical, technical, and medical support. The extensive support allows for operations based on their forces. At least this is true several days after deployment to the operating area. This allows for great flexibility in action.

However, in static defence, with growing shortages of resources and personnel, the frequent challenge is coordinating the actions of many units and tactical connections, which translates into overloading the Operational Commands' work. The solution was supposed to be the creation of Battle Groups, which would become an intermediate level. Without expanded staff, they are still inefficient. Improving the command process will be one of the most important tasks facing General Drapaty, and Ukraine should implement reforms as soon as possible.

Without radical changes, the pace of Russian advancement will increase, which is already quite substantial. For the past three months, the average daily advance pace has not fallen below 27 square kilometres (rounded to 10 square miles). Since 2014, the Russians have managed to occupy about 99% of the Luhansk region, 66% of the Donetsk region, and 73% each of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Although the situation for the Ukrainians is becoming more difficult daily, the Kremlin is still far from fulfilling its strategic plans.

At the current pace, capturing the Donetsk region will take them about two more years. However, it's not just about slowing the Russian advance and bleeding the Russians but stopping their progress. If this were a democratic country, the current actions would be justified. Still, the Russian Federation is an authoritarian country, and the death of thousands of soldiers will not affect the situation at the Kremlin. Ukrainians must physically stop the Russians and start pushing them back. At the current stage and with current issues, this is wishful thinking.