Russia’s missile mystery: Hypersonic threats or mere bluffs?

Since Ukraine received approval to use Western MGM-140 ATACMS aeroballistic missiles against targets in Russia (according to some sources, only around Kursk), the authorities in Kyiv have started suggesting that Moscow might retaliate with ballistic missiles more potent than the Iskander.

Kremlin propaganda has even threatened the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, on the night of 19-20 November, an unusual missile fell on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, it was a Russian RS-26 Rubezh, designed to carry nuclear warheads. But is that really true?

Limited reports suggest that several missiles, likely so-called reentry vehicles (RVs), fell on Dnipro. Indeed, the Rubezh missile can carry six RVs with nuclear warheads of up to 300 kilotons. The problem is that in 2018, the development of this missile was halted in favour of work on the Avangard hypersonic missile (which can be carried by the RS-26 itself), so it is doubtful that the Kremlin has a large number of Rubezhs, especially with unusual warheads.

Speculation has arisen about the possibility of using Iranian or North Korean missiles, and according to CNN, an anonymous "Western official" denied reports of the Rubezh being used in Ukraine. Shortly after the attack, Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed that a prototype medium-range missile (up to 3,000 kilometres) "Oreshek", achieving hypersonic speeds, was used in the strike. This is likely a derivative of existing or previously developed ballistic missiles, although its specifications remain unknown.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were developed in the 1950s. These included the still very imperfect American SM-65 Atlas and SM-68A Titan I, and the Soviet R-7 (formally the first "true" ICBM).

These missiles were designed to deliver thermonuclear warheads over enemy territory during a nuclear war. They were meant to be an alternative to strategic bombers, which were becoming easier to intercept. Currently, countries possessing missiles of this class include the USA, Russia, China, North Korea, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom (the latter only possesses American UGM-133 Trident II D5 missiles carried by submarines). ICBMs may be based on land (in large fixed silos or on mobile launchers) or on nuclear-powered submarines with appropriate launch systems.

ICBMs are characterised by their enormous, literally intercontinental range: at least 5,500 kilometres. These missiles are usually multi-staged, and their flight is divided into three phases: the launch phase (3-5 minutes; lifting the missile to an altitude of 150-400 kilometres), suborbital space flight (altitudes up to 1,200 kilometres, flight time up to 25 minutes), and the reentry phase (during which RVs released in the second phase attack designated targets).

Modern ICBMs are equipped with multiple RVs, usually manoeuvrable (MIRVs), with low accuracy but sufficient for nuclear warheads. Some countries, such as North Korea, possess missiles with single, extremely heavy (even several tonnes) conventional warheads. Due to the high speed of flight and manoeuvre capability of the MIRVs, they are difficult targets, requiring specialised, extremely costly ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems to counter, often using their ballistic missiles in practice.

The Russian A-135 system, which protects Moscow, even utilises small nuclear warheads. To penetrate defensive systems, missiles are equipped with decoys (false MIRVs meant to absorb counterattacks). In the unlikely event of ICBMs being used against Ukraine, the country does not possess means to intercept MIRVs (the MIM-104 Patriot would have very little chance, close to zero).

The Russian Federation's Strategic Missile Forces have approximately 360 intercontinental ballistic missiles, equipped with nearly 1,200 nuclear warheads in total.

The Russian arsenal comprises many types of rockets. Soviet-era systems are still in use, although the RT-2PM Topol-M (in service since 1984) was only retired in 2023, and it's uncertain if all have indeed been decommissioned (some - as mentioned by Major Fischer in a conversation with Wirtualna Polska - may be launched instead of being scrapped).

The massive RS-36M2 Voyevoda, weighing 211,000 kilograms, over 36 metres long, and with a range of about 11,000 kilometres (carrying up to 10 RVs), remains in service since 1988. It is a missile launched from a silo. The same is true for the RT-2PM2 Topol-M and RS-24 Yars missiles, although both have variants with mobile launchers (known as TEL).

The Topol is a single-warhead missile, in service since 1997 (stationary version since 2000). The missile weighs 46,500 kilograms, is 23 metres long, and has a range of 11,000 kilometres. Its successor, Yars, of similar size and range, entered service in 2009. The new missile, also in two variants, carries three or four MIRVs. It differs from its predecessor with better protection against anti-missile systems, extended durability by 1.5 times, and improved reliability. Despite announcements since 2014, Russia has not returned to using missiles with railway launchers (such as the RS-23 Molodets in the 15Zh61 version).

Additionally, Russia has missiles launched from under the water. They are carried by submarines of Project 667BDRM Delfin (three in service, two under repair), 955 Borey (three submarines in service), and 955A Borey (four submarines in service, three under construction, two planned). These units form one of the cornerstones of Russian strategic capability, especially after the retirement of the older 667 family and the massive Project 941 Akula units.

Delfins carry 16 R-29RMU2.1 Liner missiles each (three-stage, 15 metres long, weighing 40,300 kilograms, with a range of up to 11,000 kilometres, carrying 4 MIRVs). The newer Boreys also carry 16 more modern R-30 Bulava missiles (12 metres long, weighing 36,800 kilograms, with a range of up to 9,300 kilometres, 6-10 MIRVs). The latter were criticised upon entering service due to a shorter range than their predecessor, but effectiveness is expected to increase thanks to modern decoys and traps that complicate intercepting the nuclear warheads, and by shortening the active flight phase. The use of solid fuel instead of liquid fuel also reduces the risk of detection of the carrier and increases its reliability.

Regardless of numerous failed tests and potentially limited technical efficiency of the Russian nuclear arsenal, it is certainly sufficient to deliver a strong blow to opponents of the Russian Federation. Its use is regulated by a new doctrine adopted by the Kremlin a few days ago.

Of course, Moscow is aware that even a so-called de-escalation strike (a single attack with a low-yield warhead) could provoke a massive response from the enemy or its allies possessing nuclear weapons. This works both ways, hence nuclear weapons have not been used in combat since 1945. Intercontinental missiles themselves are also constantly "in the sights" of detection systems, and therefore every time great powers conduct tests, they are reported to rivals, to prevent the commander on the other side from mistakenly regarding an "innocent" test as the start of a nuclear war.