Russia's demographic crisis strains military and economy

The Kremlin has been aware of the shrinking population for years. As early as the 1990s, experts warned that the transition to a market economy would lead to a temporary drop in birth rates. However, they also assumed that prosperity would eventually increase, healthcare would improve, and life expectancy would rise.

Indeed, after years of decline, the number of births in Russia began to rise steadily from 2006, peaking in 2014 with 1.943 million children born. Since then, however, there has been a year-on-year decrease, which Russian demographers attribute to the crisis beginning in the Federation at that time. As a result, by the end of 2022, the birth rate had decreased by 6.7% to 1.304 million. It is estimated that this year, only around 1.2 million children will be born, and next year, 100,000 fewer.

What's worse from the Kremlin's standpoint is that in the years 2014–2015, not only did the birth rate begin to fall, but there was also an observed increase in the number of deaths. Previously, over the past 12 years, Russian mortality had been steadily declining. The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection considers that the main cause of this reversal is serious issues in the healthcare system, which is becoming less accessible, alongside deepening socio-economic difficulties.

Alcoholism and, more broadly, the unhealthy lifestyle of Russians are often cited. After alcohol, tobacco is the second most common cause of death.

Experts from the Centre for Scientific, Political, and Ideological Thought have concluded that flawed economic policy and the transition to a purportedly free market are the primary causes of the Russian demographic crisis. These reforms were implemented while ignoring demographic considerations. Moreover, they suggest, which can indeed be viewed as an ideological standpoint, that the "Russian individual" has shifted towards consumerism, losing their religiosity in the process.

Regardless of the causes, the fact remains that, according to state statistical agency data, in the years 2020-2021, the country's population decreased by a total of 1.3 million, with the number of deaths exceeding births by 1.7 million. This decline was most pronounced among ethnic Russians, whose numbers, according to the 2021 census, decreased by 5.4 million compared to the years 2010-2021. Thus, these problems began even before the attack on Ukraine. Currently, Russia's population stands at about 143.5 million, while at the beginning of the century, it was 146.3 million.

Falling birth rates will result in fewer conscripts being available for the army, which is already problematic for the Russian Ministry of Defence. This situation was anticipated at the start of the century. At that time, it was estimated that between 2010 and 2025, the number of potential conscripts aged 20 to 29 would decrease by 44%.

In March 2020, the then Defence Minister, Sergey Shoigu, reported that the number of conscripts had dropped to 225,000, almost 100,000 fewer than five years earlier. Contracted service was supposed to be the solution, which would at least partially offset the losses due to reduced conscription.

As the size of the army slowly approached the expected level, Putin initiated a war that overturned the entire reform and necessitated changes in the rules to expand conscription. The first reform, prompted by wartime experiences, began in autumn 2022. For the first time, it was decided to increase the army's personnel and commence regular reserve training, involving over 25 million men. At least in theory, because for the majority, the reservists' health is so poor that active service is not possible.

At that time, the authorities decided to mobilise an additional 500,000 conscripts and raise the upper age limit for enlistment by three years, from the current 27 to 30. The lower limit remained at 18 years.

However, it turned out that increasing losses meant the size of the army was still insufficient. Consequently, another reform was prepared. Once again, it was decided to increase the manpower. The army is eventually supposed to have 1.5 million soldiers. However, the minimum conscription age was raised to 21 years old.

The Russians concluded that eighteen-year-olds are still children whose bodies have not yet fully matured physically and who struggle to endure the hardships of warfare. Another reason openly discussed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection was the desire to protect the young male population, which was already unimpressive before, and the war exacerbated the crisis even further.

Politicians, despite being aware of demographic problems, did not react systematically for a long time. Only in the government’s Unified Plan for Achieving National Development Goals, adopted in autumn 2021, did the first initiatives appear to help improve birth rates. It was stated that stabilisation should be achieved by 2030.

However, they neglected to address the increase in life expectancy and the improvement of healthcare quality. The government mainly focused on incentivising women to give birth. They were offered a monthly allowance for childbirth and child-rearing, the provision of so-called maternity capital, which represents a future pension, and preferential conditions when applying for a mortgage.

The direct effect of these payments was akin to Poland's 500+ programme - birth rates did not increase and indeed began to decline more rapidly. The reasons for this failure were similar to those of Poland's flagship programme. Surveyed women pointed to the inadequacies of healthcare during pregnancy and the subsequent infancy period, the lack of nurseries and kindergartens, and political instability in the country. Now, another factor has been added - the "special military operation."

According to experts, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the announcement of partial mobilisation became a demographic test for the country. According to the Gaidar Institute, among the negative factors mentioned were the deteriorating economic situation, the conscription of some men into the army, and increased anxiety levels.

To mitigate this last factor, Sardana Avksentieva, a State Duma deputy and vice-chief of the New Nation faction, proposed introducing a four-day working week for parents in Russia. Avksentieva noted that for many working mothers, a four-day week would be a relief. The deputy hopes to restore balance between work and personal life for employees and believes that women will consider having children if they have more family time.

However, this may be problematic because the Russian industry, already shifted to wartime production levels, complains about a chronic labour shortage. For now, the Duma has supported a four-day working week for large families and single-parent families.

Experts also note that the authorities are not considering another aspect. More than 300,000 men have died during military operations. As demographer Igor Yefremov, cited by banki.ru, notes, the number of births has noticeably declined in regions with a higher participation of men in the operation.

In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the birth rate fell from 1.5 children per woman in 2021 to 1.22 in 2023, in Buryatia from 1.87 to 1.59, in the Kaliningrad region from 1.38 to 1.17, and in the Pskov region from 1.49 to 1.29. At the same time, the number of deaths exceeded births by 495,000. Last year, in the first nine months alone, deaths exceeded births by nearly 676,000.

In comments below articles, Russians joke that soon the State Duma will consider allowing polygamy just to save demographics and prevent refugees from entering the country. Already, industry is looking more favourably at those from former Soviet republics and South Asia. With increasing mortality among Russian men, the Kremlin may have no choice but to open its borders more widely.

Slawek Zagórski