China's maritime ambition: Reshaping global naval balance

Recently, the Chinese Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard launched an amphibious ship with a flight deck, named Sichuan (hull number 51) of Type 076 (NATO code: Yulan). It is worthwhile to recall key information, as it is an extraordinary ship.

First and foremost, it is the largest amphibious ship in the world: reportedly 252 metres long and 45 metres wide overall, with a displacement, depending on the source, reaching up to 55,000 tonnes. The ship features two islands, a relatively modern arrangement: one island likely serves as the centre for air operations, while the other may manage the ship.

Regarding the air group, the ship is notable: China does not possess vertical takeoff and landing jet aircraft (like the Harrier, Yak-36 and 38, or F-35B), so to accommodate combat jet aircraft (supposedly up to 40 planes, helicopters, and large drones combined), it is equipped with a modern electromagnetic catapult longer than the one on the Fujian aircraft carrier.

Its transport capabilities, meanwhile, can carry about 1,000 soldiers, who can be delivered ashore using two air-cushion landing craft Type 726A carried in the dock well or via helicopter. There is also an emphasis on an innovative – partially electric – propulsion system, modern radio-electronic equipment (similar to Type 054B frigates) and relatively strong armament. This is not the only symbol of China's growing maritime power.

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), like any military formation, functions as a tool of state policy. Beijing's main ambition is to replace the United States as a global hegemon to reap enormous benefits from such a unique position. The USA is primarily a maritime power, so to diminish its dominance, China requires a large fleet.

Thus, the short-term goal is to occupy the "rebellious province", as Beijing considers Taiwan (and vice versa). Organisationally, the PLAN is divided into three fleets: North Sea (main base in Qingdao), East Sea (Ningbo) and South Sea (Zhanjiang). It has extensive forces: surface, submarine, aerial, marines, and coastal defence. Currently, the Chinese fleet is already larger than the US Navy, with about 400 combat, transport, and auxiliary ships. Besides typical missions or exercises, these forces also conduct aggressive and provocative actions against countries with which China has territorial disputes (such as the Philippines).

With Beijing's growing wealth (and ambitions), larger and more modern ships are being built. In the relatively recent past, various small coastal defence ships comprised most forces (according to the "mosquito fleet" concept), yet even today, the PLAN possesses dozens of small ships (more than 80 relatively modern Type 22 missile boats have been produced).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, however, are truly royal-class ships: aircraft carriers. Today, the Chinese fleet has three such units (with the Liaoning serving more as a training-experimental ship), of which the Fujian almost matches the size of American supercarriers, and the under-construction Type 004 is expected to equal them. Both are equipped with modern electromagnetic catapults instead of ski-jumps to assist takeoff.

The core of the strike groups is in fact derived from the Soviet Su-27, the Shenyang J-11B and J-15, although the same manufacturer has developed the 5th generation naval fighter J-35, derived from the export FC-31. Amphibious ships are not far behind in size. Large Type 075 units, predecessors of the newest Type 076, are 232 metres long with a displacement of up to 44,000 tonnes, featuring a helicopter deck. The more classical yet modern Type 071 ships (210 metres and 28,000 tonnes) are smaller in size and lack a continuously flat aircraft deck. They are supplemented by smaller and older ships, totalling several dozen.

Similar to the US Navy, destroyers dominate among surface escort and strike ships. These include a few units of Russian origin (Project 956E/EM, four units). The most popular type is the not very large but numerous (about 30 in service, with at least 40 units planned) Type 052D with a length of 156 metres and a displacement of 8,270 tonnes. These are heavily armed ships, with 64 vertical launch cells and a 24-cell close-in weapon system. They are also equipped with a helicopter.

Also in service are 10 older units of earlier Type 52 variants and several Type 051B/C ships. The newest are large destroyers (or arguably cruisers) of Type 055, about 180 metres long and with a displacement of up to 14,330 tonnes. They are significantly better armed than Type 052D units (including 112 vertical launch cells and two helicopters) and appear to be quite successful escort units.

In addition, there are numerous frigates in service. The most numerous type is 054A (about 35 in service, with at least about 40 planned), alongside a dozen older and smaller units. The newest 054B frigates (two units, more planned) are relatively large, with a length of 147 metres and a displacement of 6,614 tonnes, armed with 32 vertical launch cells and a close-in defence missile launcher – they could be considered equivalent to our future Wichr ships.

The Type 056 and 056A corvettes, with a displacement of about 1,650 tonnes, are extremely numerous. They serve rather auxiliary roles, evidenced by the transfer of 22 older 056 units to the coast guard - the fleet retained "only" 50 newer units.

The core of the sub-surface component consists of large nuclear-powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. This includes seven submarines of Type 092, 094, and plans for two more of Type 094 and six to eight more modern 096s. Besides these, nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines are in service (three old Type 091, six Type 093 plus two under construction, and Type 095 is under development) as well as smaller conventional units. The latter are very numerous, with more than 30 submarines of Types 093 and 093A. Uncertainty remains regarding the new Type 041 submarine with an unknown power source – this sizable vessel reportedly sank at the turn of May and June 2024.

At the end of 2024, Beijing unveiled several types of weaponry. Alongside a series of information – including many photographs – about the amphibious ship (actually a large aircraft carrier) Type 076, materials from the flight tests of two aircraft were disclosed. These were the Shenyang J-50 and Chengdu J-36. Yet there is still a lack of specific data related to these machines in the public domain.

According to available information, these are prototype (rather demonstrator) machines of two completely different 6th generation aircraft. This suggests China is catching up with the USA, which test-flew its own machine a few years ago. Presumably, the concentration of technological novelties served as a signal to the rest of the world: China is no longer just catching up with the West but trying to surpass it and achieve an advantage, secure enough to intimidate potential competitors and lower the costs of achieving political effects, such as the potential takeover of Taiwan.

It cannot be denied that Communist China, despite many mistakes, has built a strong position as a global player, with strong economic and political standing. Therefore, competition in the military field is not surprising, although for now, it does not pose an open challenge to the main competitor – the USA and its allies.

China is investing massive resources in technological development alongside the quantitative expansion of its forces. However, it is difficult to assess the real effects: indeed, the Chinese shipbuilding industry is very efficient - perhaps more so than the American - but do China's dozens of ships really compare to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (and their successors) or their Asian counterparts? Are China's futuristic aircraft finally equipped with modern engines (as China was lagging behind Russia in this regard), modern radars, and electronics? Colloquially speaking, photographs do not show the computational power offered by Chinese onboard computers.

Moreover, despite some analysts, China is in a difficult position. Taiwan is indeed close to the coast, but to advance "further," into the area of American influence, China must contend not only with the US Navy but also with the forces of Japan, Australia, the Philippines, European allies, and possibly Vietnam or South Korea. Furthermore, the chain of islands surrounding China also serves as a formidable chain of missile bases, featuring anti-aircraft, anti-ship, or cruise missiles. China's entry into the ocean would certainly not be painless, and a long road lies ahead for Beijing. Does a state increasingly experiencing a demographic crisis still have time?