Russia's war machine: Relying on North Korea's arsenal
The Russians continue their war efforts in Ukraine largely due to the support from North Korea. Here's how Kim's regime is aiding the Russians.
The conflict in Ukraine is consuming a vast amount of ammunition. The nature of this war, where both sides can effectively monitor areas several or even dozens of kilometres behind enemy lines with drones, means that artillery and air power are crucial.
Artillery demands a constant supply of shells; during peak fighting, the daily requirement can surpass 10,000 shells. No nation can produce such quantities, and even the substantial ammunition reserves the Russians inherited from the Soviet Union are not infinite.
For Ukraine, ammunition is supplied by the West, often obtained from unexpected sources like pro-Russian Serbia or India, which seeks to remain neutral. Meanwhile, as Bloomberg notes, Russia now meets 60% of its ammunition requirements with supplies from North Korea, while local production accounts for just 30%.
Iran, Russia's second-largest foreign supplier, appears to be profiting from this situation. Iran reportedly provides only 10% of Russia's ammunition and, as with the Shahed drones, demands payment in gold or sophisticated air defence systems that it cannot manufacture itself.
Bloomberg estimates that Russia has received from North Korea 8 million shells and rockets with 122 mm and 152 mm calibres, along with a hundred KN-23/Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles and Bulsae anti-tank systems.
Ammunition from North Korea — the only supplier with poor quality
122 mm and 152 mm calibre ammunition are standard for Russia and North Korea, so their use should be seamless if production standards are upheld. Barrel artillery of this calibre can target distances of up to 15 or about 19 kilometres with standard Russian systems like the 2S1 Gvozdika or 2S3 Akatsiya. Meanwhile, the range of 122 mm rockets in BM-21 Grad systems varies from 20 kilometres to 40 kilometres, depending on the rocket type.
North Korea also supplies Russia with 130 mm shells, which, when used in field guns like the M-46, have ranges up to 27 kilometres for standard shells and up to 38 kilometres with Chinese-designed ERFB base bleed gas generator shells. However, even the Russians note that North Korean ammunition is of particularly low quality and frequently causes accidents.
Conversely, the KN-23 ballistic missiles, which use solid fuel, are conceptually similar to the Iskander-M. The exact range is unclear, but estimates suggest over 600 kilometres with a hefty 500-kilogram warhead. Their navigation is likely based on inertial guidance, possibly aided by satellite systems.
Interestingly, their manufacture involves components like bearings used in Toyota vehicles, but the overall quality of these missiles is lacking. There have been instances of them exploding mid-flight over Ukraine, far from their intended targets. Nonetheless, they present significant challenges, as Ukraine faces shortages of the missile defence systems needed to counter them, such as the Patriot, SAMP/T, and, to a lesser extent, the MIM-23 HAWK.
