Putin's pursuit of allies in a fractured global landscape

During the annual BRICS summit, named for the organisation's first five member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, Putin sought to establish new alliances. By 2024, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran had become full members. After the October summit, Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda joined as new partners, and nine other countries submitted membership applications.

The Russian leader needed this as a symbol on the international stage. Since 2022, the Russian Federation has consistently lost allies that were once traditional supporters. Countries in Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have begun distancing themselves from the Kremlin, declaring they are not interested in deepening cooperation with Russia. Armenia is also disillusioned, feeling betrayed by the Kremlin, which was once the guarantor of peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Additionally, the Russian industry is losing customers even within BRICS, which was intended as primarily an economic alliance based on mutual benefits. Meanwhile, the organisation's foundation members—Brazil and India—have turned away from purchasing arms and equipment from Russia, showing interest in Western European alternatives.

Putin has few options remaining. He needs active allies who can offer military and economic support rather than passive political backers like China, Serbia, Hungary, or certain American Republicans.

An interesting situation is that of China, which maintains economic relations with the West while supporting Russia internationally. Russia and China have strengthened their economic and military ties despite pressure from Western countries for China to condemn the invasion.

Global sanctions against Russia have benefitted China, which now acquires cheaper energy resources as a result. Since the beginning of the war, Russia's export of coal and oil to China has doubled. Last year, trade between the two nations amounted to approximately £194 billion. However, Western European countries and the USA remain the largest markets for Chinese products, prompting Beijing to maintain a delicate balance with some favour towards Moscow.

In 2023, for example, Beijing attempted to position itself as a potential mediator. In January of the previous year, a document entitled "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" was published, purporting to be a peace plan.

The West and Ukraine responded with caution. The document failed to address the issue of withdrawing Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, merely mentioning "respect for sovereignty, guarantees of independence, and territorial integrity of all countries." Furthermore, Chinese proposals coincided with Chinese-Russian discussions on military cooperation and "referenda," which, according to Kremlin propaganda, determined the "annexation" of the occupied Ukrainian regions to the Russian Federation.

Beijing has denied selling weapons to Russia, and there is indeed no evidence of such transactions. However, it supplies vehicles like trucks, off-road vehicles, and motorcycles that the Russian army utilises on the Ukrainian front. China also provides engines for attack drones, communication equipment, and light drones.

The extent of Putin's desperation in seeking allies to support him materially in the ongoing war is evident from his foreign visits. Two years ago, it would have been unimaginable for him to visit Pyongyang or Hanoi. These were not capitals of significance for the Kremlin. However, the situation has changed.

This year, Putin visited China, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Turkmenistan, where he met with Iranian President Masud Pezeszkian, as well as Belarus and North Korea. None of these countries recognised international sanctions or the International Criminal Court's decisions in The Hague to arrest Putin.

While the first four states refrained from providing military aid, the pariahs of world politics saw this as an opportunity to strengthen economic relations and gain the Kremlin's backing on the international stage. This is vital for both Iran and North Korea, whose economies are technologically backwards due to global sanctions. Cooperation with Russia will help them develop.

Both countries are primarily hoping for the transfer of technology and expertise in the design and construction of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Aviation and intelligence cooperation, especially economic intelligence, are also of great interest.

So far, Putin has only managed to recruit dictators like himself. Even countries without recognising sanctions and displaying friendly neutrality do not wish to follow his leadership. He struggles to find allies who would openly support him. He attempted in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and in Venezuela, where he supported the authoritarian president, Nicolas Maduro. Everywhere, he was rebuffed.

Thus far, little has materialised from the "creation of a new Eurasian architecture of cooperation, indivisible security, and development," as Putin described the new project. However, the West watches the growing polarisation in developing countries with mild concern. Will Putin succeed in building a new axis of evil? Much depends on the role China decides to take. They think pragmatically in Beijing, hence the Kremlin's continued overtures.

The Russia-China relationship certainly does not benefit from Putin's and Kim Jong-un's rapprochement. Beijing fears an increase in Russian influence in North Korea. The long-term consequences of this cooperation could enhance the DPRK's military capabilities. The result might be that the Americans bolster their military presence in the region, potentially threatening Beijing's interests.