NATO on alert: Tackling rising Baltic security threats
Incidents in the Baltic Sea, including the recent severing of an undersea cable, have raised concerns about the security of the region's critical infrastructure. Steven Horrell, a security expert and former US Navy intelligence officer, discusses the growing threats, NATO's strategy, and the role of the United States in defending the eastern flank.
President Zelensky clearly defined Ukraine's peace plan, which involved returning to the internationally recognised borders of 1991. In 1994, the United States provided Ukraine with security guarantees in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons. Steven Horrell, speaking on potential peace talks and Russia's intentions, says Russia violated these borders and will not stop at any line we draw on the map today.
Russia systematically bombards and attacks civilian targets with missiles and drones, destroying critical infrastructure, including energy, to make civilians suffer during winter. We cannot forget about Bucha or Izium, places of brutal war crimes where rape was used as a tool of terror. Ukraine expects not only the return of illegally occupied territories but also reparations and accountability for crimes, he states.
The idea that the USA, Europe, or Poland could impose decisions on Ukraine regarding capitulation, ceding territories, or any such transfer is unacceptable. Talking about Ukraine without its involvement is fundamentally wrong, he insists.
Tomasz Waleński: The Swedish authorities reported another severing of a cable running along the Baltic Sea floor on Friday. Investigations into possible sabotage are underway. This isn't the first such case. Is the NATO mission faltering?
Steven Horrell, security and naval expert and former US Navy intelligence officer: This is among the actions emphasised by Russia and China - hybrid actions in the so-called "grey zone." It involves undertaking actions that can be easily denied and are below the threshold of reaction, affecting areas with international status rather than Western countries or their allies' territories.
Of course, the aim is to physically destroy critical global infrastructure, along with provocations and displays of strength.
Are we helpless?
Individual NATO countries have made progress in recognising the seabed as an area of strategic significance. Take the United States, for instance. Any American strategic document will reference treating actions on the seabed equally with actions in outer space, which has also become an arena for superpower rivalry and hybrid actions.
Areas such as the seabed, international waters, and cyberspace are particularly susceptible to hybrid operations because they easily obscure their true purpose and spread disinformation. The same goes for outer space - everything that can be done with satellites or other means falls within sub-threshold actions supporting strategic interests. China and Russia systematically push the boundaries of what they can do, testing the West’s response - often, there are no consequences.
With reference to countries and events in the Baltic - after Finland, the Swedes decided to seize suspicious vessels. Should every NATO country and Baltic state act in this manner?
However, it's worth noting that the situation is somewhat different this time. The Swedes have no suspect, making it challenging to justify seizing any vessel. However, if a suspicious ship appears, individual countries should act decisively.
Actions in the Baltic are not isolated but linked to other events. This includes the Russian "shadow fleet," which evades sanctions by regularly changing ship names and ownership, making tracking them challenging.
The situation at sea is entirely different from in the air - it's much more difficult to conceal. A quick visit to websites like FlightRadar shows almost every plane. Ships should also always have an AIS (Automatic Identification System). The key issue, however, is that AIS can be spoofed, turned off, or impersonated by another vessel. All these elements are interconnected.
It's encouraging to see more countries beginning to acknowledge this threat. For example, France recently published a seabed defence strategy. We would certainly benefit from reaching a consensus and adopting a comprehensive approach to this issue within both NATO and the EU. We need to develop a strategy that enables an effective response and proactive preventive measures.
So, is the recent NATO decision to increase presence in the Baltic inadequate?
Deploying warships isn't the only option, and it won't solve all problems. Constructing a network of sensors, also in international waters, is possible and necessary. Sensors can be placed on both the seabed and the surface.
Unmanned marine systems could also be employed—Ukraine is an example of their effectiveness. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has achieved significant successes thanks to unmanned systems, both surface and underwater. They can also detect undesirable actions, providing a fuller picture of the situation visually, acoustically, and otherwise.
Therefore, a proactive and coordinated strategy is needed, focusing not only on response but also on early detection and prevention of threats before incidents occur.
Should we assume then that this is not the last incident involving underwater infrastructure?
I fear that such activities will increase. The threat concerns internet cables and key elements of energy infrastructure that may become targets. These actions are cowardly and reprehensible, but they could become military objectives that need to be accomplished and neutralised in open conflict.
That's why we must be prepared for every eventuality. We should act now instead of waiting for the situation to deteriorate further.
So does NATO still lack a strategy for the Baltic Sea area?
I know that the Alliance made a conscious decision not to create separate regional strategies - and I agree with this approach. NATO's plan must be coherent and comprehensive, considering all threats from a 360-degree view. We will not focus solely on the Baltic or Black Sea but will act globally. It is crucial to identify a central operational point - defining it is already a step towards proactive actions. Developing regional plans and increasing involvement and resource allocation for implementation was critical. It's confidential, so details are unknown.
But do the plans developed a few years ago include such a strategy? At the time, we weren’t facing the situations we are now. The Baltic was relatively calm.
These are fundamental questions we must ask ourselves. Today, we know the strategic environment has changed radically in the three years since Russia started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Unfortunately, we cannot focus solely on the opponent's actions in the strategic landscape. We must also consider the changing role of NATO’s largest force.
How could the potential absence of the USA affect NATO's eastern flank? Could the American absence in the Baltic cause continuous incidents there? Communications from Donald Trump’s camp are, to say the least, inconsistent.
Messages from various directions make organisation and interpretation extremely difficult. The Secretary of Defense says one thing, the Vice President another, and the President another. Additionally, the issue of billionaires informally influencing policy is how their narrative relates to the administration's official positions.
We're confronted with an avalanche of inconsistent messages. The situation seems to have spiralled more out of control than even the most cynical analysts of Trump's presidency could have anticipated.
What does this mean for Poland? During his visit, the new Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, suggested that there should be even more US soldiers stationed there than currently.
Do we need a more significant American military presence in Poland? Such signals and decisions were also present during Donald Trump's first presidency.
Given the current scenario, it's exciting to consider what will happen with the Aegis Ashore base in Redzikowo. However, answering that question is challenging.
The base has just been opened.
That's correct. However, reports vary - some are sensible, while others are entirely absurd. For example, blaming Ukraine for starting the war is morally unacceptable.
Many actions and statements by the current administration raise serious moral concerns. Suggesting that Russia, having suffered enormous losses, should retain the occupied territories is appalling. Similarly, the idea that the USA, Europe, or Poland could impose decisions on Ukraine about capitulation or ceding territories is unacceptable. Engaging in talks about Ukraine's fate without its involvement is a fundamentally flawed approach.
The Kremlin's messages before Crimea's annexation - Putin's vision of a multipolar world from 19th-century imperialism - stem from the belief that accumulating enough power entitles one to a sphere of influence to manipulate at will. Now, a similar message is coming from the White House. Discussions about Canada or Greenland? It’s a rejection of the rule-based global order of the past 80 years, which brought prosperity post-World War II. The clock is rewinding another hundred years.
From Trump, we hear that talks with Russia were better than those with Ukraine.
President Zelensky has clearly defined Ukraine's peace plan – a return to the internationally recognised borders of 1991. The United States provided Ukraine with security guarantees in 1994 for surrendering nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia violated these borders and will not stop at any line we draw today.
Ukraine's expectations for the return of all illegally occupied territories, including Crimea, reparations from Russia, and accountability for war crimes remain non-negotiable. I hope Zelensky's points persist in negotiations. I am also pleased that Ukraine maintains a stance in Kursk - a crucial bargaining element in this war.
Russia systematically bombards and targets civilians with missiles and drones, decimating critical infrastructure, including energy, to make civilians suffer during winter. We cannot forget Bucha or Izium - sites of brutal war crimes where rape was used as a terror tool.
Yet, the President of the USA appears to side with the aggressor. Trump aims to amend the G7 statement to retract Russia's clear designation as the aggressor.
Global media reports suggest this could be part of a larger strategy to disrupt the Russia-China alliance somehow.
Such a notion is preposterous. According to Putin, his wishes will not cause him to sever ties with Beijing.
Isn’t it part of a pivot towards the Indo-Pacific?
There has been talk of a strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific since 2012, with the current US doctrine considering a hierarchy of threats. Everyone should know that Russia poses a significant threat, and we must halt its activities to prioritise other matters.
Is the USA planning more engagement in the Indo-Pacific at Europe's expense, prompting it to fend for itself? This is a topic for debate, but it isn’t the main direction of current changes. We are in a global clash between freedom and democracy—the values of open societies—and autocratic regimes. Yet, the US administration seems to be favouring autocrats, Putin's allies.
Due to his experiences, Pete Hegseth may focus too much on the Middle East when discussing the hierarchy of threats. Shaped by the war on terror, his priority might be threats from Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Iran, and its proxies. However, none of these threats are as existential as those from China or Russia.
J.D. Vance in Munich argued that these are not existential threats—at least not for Europe. However, the conference discussed little about Russia and the war in Ukraine. Instead, it focused on defence and European spending.
At the top levels of the current administration, inaccurate statements are made concerning Europe's contributions to NATO and Ukraine's security. The facts are clear: Europe has done more for Ukraine than the United States, period. It's indisputable.
The target of 2% of GDP for defence funding for NATO members is not Donald Trump's responsibility. It was established in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea. When Trump took office, only seven NATO countries met this requirement. By the end of his term, it had risen to 11.
Yes, but some members still haven’t met that goal.
Since then, an additional 10 countries have met the required level of defence spending. Of course, 2% should not be treated as a ceiling but as a minimum. However, considering reports about the Trump administration, media claims of Hegseth announcing 8% annual defence budget cuts for the next five years are known.
No specific decisions have been made yet. If those cuts materialise, US defence spending could fall from 3.4% of GDP to below 2%. This could change if US GDP significantly grows, but there's no indication the administration is working towards this.
In this situation, can NATO still deter threats? Especially on the eastern flank.
NATO's eastern flank has shown exceptional readiness over the past decade. Countries closest to Russia's border quickly recognised the threat and increased their defence spending. Finland and Sweden are joining this group, further strengthening regional security.
But this is at a European level. Should Europe then move towards autonomy from the USA and NATO?
The debate on this has continued for years. Some argue that resources allocated to the EU's defence project could be used better within NATO or on regional plans, like those proposed by General Cavoli, the NATO commander in Europe.
Instead of creating alternative structures, we should focus on strengthening NATO. However, debates on this topic will likely intensify, leading Europeans to reconsider the issue.
I still believe NATO is the best answer to contemporary threats. Regional plans, command structures, standardisation, and interoperability have significantly strengthened the Alliance.
Numerous positive changes have been implemented to make NATO so robust today.
Steven Horrell is a Senior Fellow in the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Before joining CEPA, he served as a US Navy intelligence officer for 30 years, reaching the rank of captain before retiring in 2021. He graduated from the US Naval Academy.
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