Kremlin renews barrages: Civilian sites hit as arms production strains

Nearly two weeks before the Russian attack, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine indicated that a massive missile strike was anticipated around Ukraine's Independence Day. Estimates of Russian stock levels, production scale, and assumed attack frequency were provided.

The data, published on 16 August, proved more accurate than summer weather forecasts. The Kremlin launched strikes on 15 Ukrainian regions during the night from Sunday to Monday, a day after the national holiday. A total of 127 missiles (102 were shot down) and 109 drones (99 were shot down) were used in the attack. The previous comparable attack took place on 11 April, when 82 missiles and drones were fired at Ukraine.

The declining frequency of mass attacks is not surprising, given the inefficiency of the arms industry and the enormous costs involved. Monday's bombardment alone is estimated to have cost Russia 1.26 billion dollars, according to “Ukrainian Truth.” Even if these figures are exaggerated, the Kremlin must have "burned through" at least hundreds of millions with no clear effect.

A year ago, it was expected that the Russians would attack with 50-60 missiles every two to three weeks, limiting the scale of strikes between rounds. This was linked to the production cycle of primarily Kh-101 cruise missiles. These, alongside Iranian drones, are the primary airborne strike weapons.

In 2021, Russian factories produced 56 Kh-101 missiles. Last year, this number rose to 460. Currently, after the economy has been consistently geared towards war mode, the Russian industry can deliver a maximum of 500 missiles annually. The question is whether this is the peak of Russian capabilities.

In the latest attack, the Putinists used 77 Kh-101s, which is nearly two months' production. Data from the last three weeks indicate the scale of this effort for the Kremlin. The day after the mass attack, on 27 August, only five Kh-101s were fired.

The same issue arises with ballistic missiles for the Iskander system. Production of 9M723 rockets with a range of over 311 miles increased from around 50 annually before the war to 180 last year and 150 currently. For more complex 9M729 missiles with a range of over 932 miles, the Russians can produce about 100 annually.

However, Iskanders are used more frequently but on a smaller scale. Six were deployed in the last mass attack, and two the following day. Generally, the Russians launch up to 10 missiles a week from this system.

The Russian industry also struggles with the supply of the more complex hypersonic Kinzhal missiles. Only six were fired in the last two attacks, and this was after a nearly two-week break. In this way, the Russians disposed of two months' production of 47M2 missiles. Hence, the main long-range strike force consists of Iranian Shaheeds.

Last year, the Kremlin launched licensed production of Shahed-136 drones, known in Russia as Geran-2. Thanks to their simple construction, primary engines, and the use of components from civilian drones, the Russians can produce about 500 Geran-2s monthly. Therefore, they are used in Ukraine daily, although the scale usually does not exceed a dozen deployed aerial vehicles. This is exactly as many as one battery can deploy. However, in the last two attacks over Ukraine, 190 Geran-2s were launched, of which Ukrainian air defence shot down 152, and two fell on Belarusian territory.

The attacks using them often appear chaotic. Drones destroyed, for example, a 19th-century manor that housed the Ataman Nestor Makhno museum and a hotel in Kryvy Rih – targets of no strategic military value—similarly, attacks on the Agricultural High School in Odrane and allotments in the Nikopol region.

This randomness in target selection and the Geran-2 losses of up to 90% seem not to faze Russia. For the Kremlin, it does not matter whether they hit military or civilian targets – their main task is to spread terror. Drone attacks are primarily meant to have a psychological effect, much like the German V-1 missile attacks on London and Antwerp in the final months of World War II.

The Russians have not yet solved another crucial problem—a shortage of operational aircraft capable of carrying long-range cruise missiles. First, Ukrainian attacks have driven bombers far from the missile launch zones, and second, spare parts are increasingly scarce, significantly reducing the combat readiness of these aircraft.

This is particularly evident in the case of heavy Tu-95 bombers, used to carry Kh-101 and Kh-22 Raduga missiles, and MiG-31K, a specially modified version adapted to carry Kinzhal missiles. Before the war, about 40% of the 44 Tu-95MS and 20 Tu-95MSM were combat-ready. The percentage has now dropped to 20%.

Only a few of the 22 MiG-31Ks owned by Russia are currently operational. Therefore, for about a month, no more than three MiG-31s have been airborne at any given time.

It will be difficult for the Russians to improve combat readiness, as none of the main types of cruise missile carriers are still in production. Hence, cannibalisation of the most worn-out units is becoming more common – parts from these are used to repair combat-ready machines.

All these factors contribute to the increasingly rare use of ballistic and cruise missiles by the Russians. The Kremlin will again have to wait several weeks before conducting another attack of a similar scale.

When Putin dismissed Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu in May, one of the reasons cited for his departure was corruption among ministry officials. In place of Shoygu, Andrei Belousov was appointed – an economist, advisor to several successive Russian prime ministers, and above all, Putin's trusted “economy man.”

Belousov's primary goal is to integrate the military industry with other sectors of the economy. He is also tasked with tidying up finances allocated for armaments. After three months, there is no noticeable acceleration in this area yet. However, this does not mean the situation will remain static indefinitely.