Baltic tension: Securing vital undersea cables amid threats

Damage to submarine telecommunication and energy cables, as well as gas pipeline failures, poses a significant threat to EU and NATO countries. These are also tools used in hybrid operations. Successive leaders of Western countries are speaking seriously about sabotage by the Russian "shadow fleet" and units linked to China.

The situation is so critical that during the summit organised on Tuesday in Helsinki at 9:00 AM GMT, the main topic was securing strategic underwater infrastructure and strengthening NATO's presence in the Baltic.

Despite the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to include Sweden and Finland, the Baltic has not become a fully controlled internal NATO basin. Russia, with participation from the "shadow fleet" and also Chinese ships, continually tests the resilience of the Alliance, the EU, and regional countries. These waters have become a territory where these forces engage in hybrid operations. The situation in the Baltic can be considered a litmus test indicating the degree of international tension," explains Kinga Dudzińska, an analyst for Baltic and Nordic states at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, during an interview with money.pl.

Zuzanna Nowak, an expert from IEEI and director of analysis at the think tank The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs, is also certain. "The Baltic Sea has become one of the main targets of Russian (and potentially other, such as Chinese, related to Russia) hybrid attacks due to its strategic significance and increased NATO presence after the accession of Finland and Sweden," she admits.

Around 30 international cables and six gas pipelines are on the bottom of the Baltic. This network is susceptible to terrorist attacks and activities by special services, which are classified as below the threshold of war. This involves covert actions testing resilience, diversions and sabotage alongside a whole range of hybrid attacks.

The damage to the Balticconnector pipeline in the autumn of 2023 or the disruption of telecommunication cables and the EstLink 2 power bridge at the end of December of the previous year are just recent examples of suspicious "incidents" that have occurred in the Baltic.

The timing of these "incidents" suggests deliberate actions, as pointed out by leaders from various countries. There are analogies drawn between the events concerning China and Taiwan and the situation in the Baltic, which can indicate a certain strategic approach," comments Kinga Dudzińska in a conversation with money.pl.  

Let us recall that at the beginning of January 2025, there was an interruption in the telecommunication cable connecting Taiwan to the mainland. Authorities in Taipei accused China of cutting it, while Beijing denied it.

The pattern of actions seems similar for a reason.

For this reason, NATO will establish a Baltic Guard, aimed at enhancing maritime security using frigates, patrol aircraft, and other types of weaponry, announced NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Tuesday.

The problem of protecting maritime infrastructure is serious. The energy and strategic security of NATO and the EU depend upon it. 

As Zuzanna Nowak explains, Russia seeks weak points, testing response mechanisms, including regional solidarity. It also attempts to undermine the sense of security in the Baltic and Nordic states by exerting pressure on key economic energy and communication infrastructure, leading to political destabilisation, fueled by disinformation attacks.

It is also significant that NATO forces are compelled to disperse resources across various theatres of operation, distracting attention from Ukraine. Simultaneously, Russia's reliance on Baltic ports for export and military operations constitutes its own weakness, notes the IEEI expert.

The issue includes both protecting gas pipelines (among which is the Baltic Pipe supplying Poland) and the fibre-optic and telecommunication network. "They are responsible for the flow of information between allies, which is crucial for cooperation within NATO and the EU," explains Dudzińska.

Energy bridges are also an extremely important element of critical underwater infrastructure. Thanks to them, the Union can build an internal power market. Mutual connections stabilise the system and allow for the transfer of electricity between specific countries if necessary.

In the southern part of the Baltic, we have the entire "Baltic energy ring". As we reported on money.pl, the operation of switching Lithuania from the Russian power system to the European one at the beginning of the Polish presidency in the EU might become another target for Russian interference. "The planned disconnection of the Baltic states from the Russian BRELL energy ring in February 2025 further increases the need to protect critical infrastructure, including land-based ones," emphasises Nowak.

This is a key operation for making the Baltic states independent of Russian electricity supplies, which will also strengthen the security of NATO's eastern flank. The energy bridge connecting continental Europe with the "energy island" of the Baltic countries passes through the Suwalki Gap. This is where the LitPol Link line runs, and an important Harmony Link connection is also planned there. Meanwhile, the SwePol cable connects Ustka with Karlshamn in Sweden, and NordBalt connects the Swedish town of Nybro with Klaipeda in Lithuania. Further, two EstLink lines connect Estonia with Finland. All these cables form an important energy ring, securing the countries that make up today's eastern and northern flank of NATO.

The increasing frequency and sophistication of such attacks emphasises the urgent need for coordinated regional and NATO strategies to protect critical infrastructure and prevent future incidents. Especially since Poland's role in supporting Ukraine or building the energy security of Central and Eastern Europe makes it a potential target for Russian retaliation, notes Zuzanna Nowak.

Just before Tuesday's summit, European Commission Vice-President Henna Virkkunen declared in Helsinki that the EU is ready to increase investments in cable infrastructure and cooperate with NATO to protect it. The idea is to expand the network so that severed connections can be effectively bypassed by others.

In addition to monitoring and securing networks, NATO and the EU have set themselves the goal of eliminating the "shadow fleet" from the Baltic. Ships used to transport sanctioned Russian oil pose a real threat, partly due to their poor technical condition.

The Baltic Sea, moreover, is a protected maritime area. Ships entering here must meet strict regulations. Among them are emission standards and highly specific technical conditions. Another issue is that Russia, with China's involvement, uses these ships for espionage tasks.

The problem is that by disrupting satellite navigation systems, disabling automatic identification systems (AIS), and transmitting falsified data, these Russian ships try to disappear among the multitude of vessels passing through the Baltic. However, this increases the risk of collisions and maritime disasters.

"The Baltic is one of the most crowded waterways. On average, 2,000 vessels pass through it each day. It is also a relatively shallow sea, which enhances its sensitivity to threats," emphasises the PISM analyst.

Catching these ships will be crucial to the role of Denmark and Sweden, which control the straits through which ships exit the Baltic. Accidental incidents accompanying diversionary activities may also present an additional problem.

Damaging underwater infrastructure by dragging an anchor across the seabed (as was reportedly the case with the EstLink cable - ed.) is also associated with another serious threat. The Baltic is a sea where mines from World War II and sunken pollutants still lie on the seafloor," reminds Kinga Dudzińska. Such disturbance could lead to a catastrophe.

Przemysław Ciszak, journalist of money.pl