Ukrainian withdrawal from Krynky: A costly battle on the Dnipro

Before the war, Krynky was a notable urban-type settlement, a term used in the East to describe villages resembling suburban housing estates. Today, it is merely a sea of ruins at the mouth of the Konka River, where it meets the Dnipro.

The last inhabitants were evacuated in June 2023 when the Russians blew up the dam in Kakhovka. This destruction prompted the Ukrainians to begin the first reconnaissance and diversionary raids aimed at dispersing Russian forces ahead of their planned summer counteroffensive.

However, the counteroffensive stalled after more than two months, and the Russians initiated a series of strikes on Avdiivka, Maryinka, and Vuhledar. The Ukrainians needed a public relations success to demonstrate to the West that their aid was not in vain and to reassure their own society that the army was still reclaiming lost territories. This was when the idea of conducting an amphibious landing near Krynky was conceived.

On 20 October, the Ukrainians executed a landing near Krynky, which, catching the Russians off guard, quickly fortified itself. In the following weeks, most of the fighting occurred on the Dnipro, with the Ukrainians organising raids on one side and the Russians striving to capture the Dnipro islands to control river movement.

In the water clashes, the Ukrainians generally had the upper hand, utilising a river flotilla equipped with vessels adapted for operations in shallow waters. The Russians had to resort to hastily armed civilian motorboats.

In the narrow passages between the islands, Galaxy Trident 26-foot boats, produced by the Ukrainian company Brig Motors, were engaged in combat. These semi-rigid hulled vessels can transport 12 soldiers at up to 50 mph speeds and are armed with a single 7.62 mm machine gun. Less frequently, the larger but better-armed Defiant 40 cutters, designed to support smaller units with firepower, were also utilised.

At least three transport-landing vessels participated in the operations near Krynky. These vessels had been converted from requisitioned river cruisers. This conversion was possible because the R-51 project cruisers, also known as "Moscows," were designed with the potential for quick modification into landing ships. This could be observed in the construction of the windows, designed for quick retrofitting with steel plates instead of glass, and how they open to facilitate landing operations.

Unfortunately, larger riverine units were swiftly withdrawn from the fighting near the bridgehead, especially the slower and heavier ones like the old BMK-T cutters, several of which were destroyed by drones. As artillery and drones took over the bulk of the combat on both sides, soldiers on land and river units became easy targets.

During the heaviest winter fighting over six weeks, the Ukrainians lost about 50 cutters, which were either damaged or sunk. The Russians suffered similar losses.

After the Russians brought in rocket and tube artillery, the Ukrainians at the bridgehead faced daily bombardments, followed by attacks from the 24th, 26th, and 28th mechanised infantry regiments and the 17th tank regiment of the 70th Mechanized Division. The Ukrainian resistance soon turned a small tactical raid into a large operation, drawing significant Russian forces.

The lack of progress forced the Kremlin to deploy elite units to the battlefield, including the 328th Air Assault Regiment of the 104th Air Assault Division of the Guards and the 810th Separate Guards Marine Brigade. At one point, about 4,000-5,000 Russians surrounded the Ukrainian bridgehead.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians in Krynky had a maximum of 350 men at any one time. Additionally, these soldiers were deprived of heavy equipment. Coastal conditions, the limited number of landing craft available for transporting tanks, and the high number of drones in use over the Dnipro meant that the Marines could only rely on their own artillery and drones for support.

It reached the point where the soldiers at the bridgehead effectively became bait; when the Russians attacked them, Ukrainian artillery and drones would disrupt the assaults. For instance, on 9 December, the independent battalion "Madziar’s Birds," commanded by Robert "Madziar" Brovdy, destroyed four out of five tanks and all six armoured personnel carriers attacking Krynky.

On 18 December, a TOS-1A rocket system, firing shells with thermobaric warheads, and the latest Russian T-90 tank were destroyed. On 24 December, the desperate Russians resorted to using banned chemical weapons in the village. Even then, they failed to defeat the Ukrainian marines.

The fighting at the Krynky bridgehead was characterised by the widespread use of loitering munitions. The Ukrainians primarily employed F-7T and Gryphon quadcopters, capable of carrying mortar grenades.

During two weeks of December battles, the destruction of over 40 armoured vehicles was confirmed. Analysts from the Oryx project calculated that by 5 January, the Russians had lost 150 different types of armoured vehicles, and within the next six months, an additional 500.

The Russians also utilised Lancet loitering munitions and FPV drones. It was thanks to drones that they managed to sever communication with the right bank of the river, forcing the Ukrainians to communicate at night. This meant the soldiers at the bridgehead were almost entirely without the ability to rotate and resupply.

The fighting near Krynky took place in highly challenging, swampy terrain, making it difficult to dig in. Dramatic accounts from the soldiers who fought there appeared on social media. In theory, they were to be rotated approximately weekly, but units were replaced once every two to three weeks in practice. One record-holder, nicknamed "Fartovoy" ("Lucky") near Krynky, spent 72 days at the bridgehead – from 2 December 2023 to 14 February 2024. He indeed had to be fortunate to survive that slaughter.

The Ukrainians tried to rotate soldiers from the 35th, 36th, 37th, and 38th Marine Brigades, creating small combat groups from them. Yet, this proved very challenging. Priority in evacuation was given to the wounded, and there were so many that the limited river forces could not undertake all the tasks. Many marine soldiers drowned during the crossing - some due to their injuries, others because of the heavy equipment they wore during the passage.

"We tried to collect all the dead on the shore to take them, but a boat arrives, and they start to cover them with fire. Many died there. Dozens," said Bogomol, a medic from the 2nd Battalion of the 37th Marine Brigade to slidstvo.info.

"As soon as we had a wounded person, we immediately informed them that a boat should be sent at night. Many boats did not arrive; some boys lay with severed limbs for 10 days, and the boats were unable to come to us," "Fartovoy" described to the same service.

By the end of June 2024, 788 Ukrainian soldiers were missing, most likely dead. The bodies of 262 fallen infantrymen were transported to the right bank. Over 2,000 were wounded.

Ukrainian staff officers remain cautious in their assessments of the operation. They emphasised that a lot of Russian equipment had been destroyed. Whether the bloodshed of marine soldiers was worth it remains unanswered.