Ukraine's victory plan: Allies' hesitation amid shifting tides

On Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's victory plan in the Verkhovna Rada. It's a five-point strategy to compel Russia to make peace and end the war by 2025. Kyiv has been building anticipation around this plan since the start of the Kursk operation, which has been ongoing for over two months. Some commentators have described it as a "wish festival."

Oleksandr Khara, Ukrainian diplomat and security expert: First, it's more of a strategy than a plan, and a strategy should be outlined with broad strokes. It includes a triad: goals, methods, and means. In classified annexes, shared only with Western partners, it details how Ukraine intends to use these resources to achieve its objectives.

Invitation to NATO, more weapons, including long-range ones, security guarantees, and economic investments—Zelensky talked about these, but we've heard it since the Russian invasion began, and the West has been hesitant to agree. What's changed now that Kyiv expects allies to accept the plan?

The plan obviously includes points Ukraine has requested before. No one has yet figured out how to wage a war without weapons. We have 13 brigades ready for deployment, but there's nothing to arm them with, and that's not a normal situation. So why did Zelensky raise them again now? It’s because awareness has changed.

Before the invasion, the United States thought it could pursue a policy of containment with Russia, trying to negotiate with them. They failed. Then they adhered to the Kremlin's "red lines," fearing to provide arms. The outcome was that after the counter-offensive in 2023, partners began telling Ukraine they had given us everything, yet there were no results, so it was time to think about negotiations. The Kursk operation changed that. It ended the narrative that the war was at a stalemate. Our actions have influenced partners' change of stance.

Where do you see this change in awareness? The attack on Russian territory indeed made Ukraine a top media topic again. But did it change the White House's approach? Americans still consider preventing a nuclear war, not Ukraine's victory, as the primary goal. This means the Kremlin can indefinitely blackmail the West. Kyiv fought fiercely for permission to attack military targets in Russia with Western arms, which could shift the balance and happens to be one of the central points of Zelensky's plan. The United States, however, remains steadfast.

Biden has had this approach from the beginning—avoiding confrontation, so every weapon reached us with significant delays. And Ukraine keeps crossing the Kremlin's "red lines"—initially, these were attacks on military bases in Crimea, then the controversy around transferring F-16s, and finally, we began operations in the Kursk region. And what? Putin still hasn’t pressed his red button.

Nuclear war is the last thing Ukraine would want, but it's also crucial to understand that deterring a nuclear attack does not work through concessions. It’s effective only when both sides realise that mutual destruction will occur. Kyiv is counting on the Biden administration to change its stance before the end of its term, at least due to the risk of Trump returning to power. The White House still has substantial funds it can allocate to support Ukraine and provide precisely what we need.

Recently, Biden said he wants to see Ukraine win. For the first time since the invasion began, he didn't employ vague terms like "Ukraine cannot be defeated" or "Russia cannot win." It may only be words or an acknowledgement that he must do everything he can while he is still president. Otherwise, he'd leave an even larger crisis in Europe and the awareness of a vast number of wasted Ukrainian lives and American taxpayers' money.

But no specific declaration came from Biden either, and it was Zelensky who presented Ukraine's victory plan to him first—back in September when Ukraine was still riding the "Kursk wave." So much so that before he could return from Washington, the American press was already writing that the plan "didn't impress" because there wasn't "much new in it." It doesn't seem, then, that Biden is inclined towards radical moves, especially those like bringing Ukraine closer to NATO, which is the first point in the plan and a "red line" for the Kremlin.

It's essential to emphasise that it's not about membership but an invitation to the Alliance with a deferred perspective of joining NATO. Ukraine wants to show that Russia has no veto power in NATO and cannot block any country from joining the Alliance. However, looking at Germany's stance, which fears World War III, and Viktor Orbán, effectively Russia's representative in the EU, receiving an invitation is currently impossible. However, Ukraine has much to offer NATO.

Experienced soldiers? That's point five of the plan.

Yes, it’s an exciting proposition. Ukrainian soldiers could replace Americans and Europeans on NATO’s eastern flank. We could bolster the Baltic States contingent, perhaps even Romania. We currently have one of the strongest armies in Europe with actual combat experience, something no Western army has.

So, Ukraine could significantly contribute to the European security architecture after the war. Instead of waiting for Ukraine’s defeat, which would equate to the entire West's defeat, NATO can utilise our potential. The more of our soldiers survive, the better it is for Europe. But for that to happen, we must end the war on our terms.

Which terms? Not all soldiers on the front believe in ultimately liberating occupied territories. During Zelensky's aforementioned visit to the US, the press kept leaking that "the climate had changed" and the West was moving towards peace according to the formula: NATO membership or security guarantees in exchange for coming to terms with the fact that the occupied territories will be returned diplomatically one day. Is Ukraine ready to accept this?

This topic often emerges in discussions with the British and Americans. They envision it this way: we'll divide the territory, part of which will enter NATO and part of which will remain under Russia’s factual control. Legally, no one will recognize this, which will allow future attempts to reclaim these lands by diplomatic means.

For Ukraine, this is the worst-case scenario. Firstly, it’s a misunderstanding of the Russian mentality. The West hopes for change if Putin dies. They don’t understand that another will take his place when Putin leaves. Russia has never returned seized territories—Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Kuril Islands... Diplomacy is powerless here. Secondly, Putin will use any freezing of the war to prepare for its next stage. It’s inevitable, and Ukrainian society is fully aware of that.

But to answer the question: no, Ukraine will not give up its territories.

So Kyiv is in a stalemate? The West doesn't understand the plan, aid is gradually dwindling, and allies, in the third year of the war, still can't decide whether Ukraine should not lose or must win.

In reality, Americans don’t need any plan to know what Ukraine needs to gain an advantage on the battlefield and end the war on its own terms.

They knew this back in 2022 but didn’t act. Simple military calculations show that modern manoeuvre warfare cannot be conducted without air dominance or at least parity. That's precisely why the 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive was doomed.

If we had sufficient fighter jets and artillery systems, the attrition in the front-line zones would have ended with aerial bombs. Civilians suffer, and military personnel are at risk during rotations. However strong fortifications may be, none can withstand the impact of a 500-kilogram bomb.

With parity in the air, Russia’s human strength advantage would also lose its significance. We have better technology, preparation, and motivation. We want to fight as NATO would fight an enemy, not engage in trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. We need equipment that our partners can give us. The United States has thousands of aircraft and other weapons rusting in stockpiles.

But they don’t, because the West lacks a cohesive vision for ending the war?

Currently, there is neither a strategy nor a vision. Previous ones assumed that Ukrainian successes on the battlefield would force Russia to negotiate, but that is another complete misunderstanding of Russia and its political and cultural structure.

The West is faced with a dilemma: wait until Ukrainians surrender and sit down to negotiations, accept territorial losses, or increase aid to Ukraine and give it another chance to achieve some results.

And here begins the analysis of what's more beneficial for the USA: a possible escalation of relations with Russia or Ukraine’s defeat. Will Europe be safe, or will it need to spend much more on defence?

Our defeat means that other dictators will feel at ease, so there will be other conflicts and other wars. There will be a drive to possess nuclear weapons because, with them, one can achieve anything. From this point of view, Ukraine’s defeat is inconvenient for the whole world.

Imagine a scenario where the West still decides not to decide. Ukraine doesn't get an invitation to NATO or permission to use Western weapons to attack targets deep in Russia. Biden's term ends and Ukraine falls into a transition period, during which the new White House administration doesn't have time for foreign policy. Weapon supplies are depleted, troops are exhausted, the society too, and the economy is very poor. It seems that Zelensky’s plan was a desperate attempt to avoid ending the war on Russia’s terms.

In the described situation, we will rely solely on our own forces and the Ukrainian defence sector. We produce dozens of types of drones and are developing missile systems that have already proven themselves on the battlefield. So, if partners don't support the victory plan, it will be tough for us, but it doesn’t mean the end. In a sense, it frees our hands because we won't have to adhere to Western-imposed rules.

Moreover, one reason why the operation in the Kursk region was successful is precisely because Russians were convinced that we were Western puppets and wouldn’t do anything without their consent. But this time, we didn’t ask.

The Kursk operation is actually a good example. Brilliant planning and execution, but the situation for soldiers fighting in Russia is difficult after two months. Even the greatest strategic genius can't do much against the mass with which Russia fights and the chronic shortage of arms Ukraine suffers from. In two months, Russia has taken 21 times more Ukrainian territory than in the entire 2023 year.

Putin is pressuring now because he believes that if Trump returns to power, everything will change dramatically. Without Trump in the White House, the Kremlin will struggle. Inflation is rising in Russia, and there is a huge labour shortage. The country has its limits regarding its ability to conduct war. Analyses suggest that in 2025, it will reach the peak of its capabilities regarding weapons production.

So, however difficult the situation may be, it is not hopeless. We still have the ability to attack military targets in Russia with our own weapons, and we have the ability to encourage the West to support us. We have great hope that allies will believe that Ukraine can achieve further success on the front, so there is reason to invest in it.

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Oleksandr Khara - Diplomat, foreign policy and security expert. Assistant to the Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2020), expert at the Foreign Affairs Maidan think tank, collaborator of Ukraine's National Security Council, and collaborator with the Embassy in Canada and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.