Ukraine strikes key Russian base in Crimea, exposing gaps in air defence
The Ukrainians launched a missile attack on the Russian airport in Dzhankoy, Crimea, which, under the protection of the S-400 system, was supposed to house even dozens of helicopters from the Mi-28, Ka-52 Alligator, and Mi-8 families. We explain what could have been destroyed.
On the night of 16 April, the Ukrainians launched an attack on the Dzhankoy airport, which serves as an operational base for the 39th helicopter regiment of the 27th mixed aviation division of the 4th Air Force and Air Defence Forces Command. The recordings below show huge fires, the location of which coincides with the place where the helicopters and the S-400 Triumph battery system are stationed.
Here's what the Russians had at the Dzhankoy base
Prior satellite images indicated that at the airport the Russians had their latest, albeit few in numbers, Ka-52 Alligator helicopters, assault Mi-28N machines, and Mi-8 family transport helicopters. Considering the problems with accessing modern components used for their production, Russians cannot recover the losses quickly enough.
The most valuable were the Ka-52 Alligator helicopters, which are a developmental version of the Ka-50 from the 1990s. These machines use a unique counter-rotating rotor system developed by the Kamov design bureau. Its major advantage is the elimination of the need for a tail rotor found in classic configurations. Moreover, Russian machines also use an unusual side-by-side seating arrangement, unlike the one above the other, known, for example, from the AH-1Z Viper.
Russians very actively used these helicopters costing £12 million each at the initial stage of the war, which resulted in very high losses for them. In the later stages of the war, they were used as tank hunters and as "eyes" for the Mi-28N helicopters.
Ka-52 Alligators are supposed to have an advanced target detection and self-defence system. The first includes, among other things, an optoelectronic head with a thermal imaging camera and the onboard radar Sword-U. The latter is a self-defence system L-370P2 Vitebsk, which, among others, can jam enemy radars and blind incoming missile rockets with a laser beam.
This is the theory, as practice has shown that it is either underdeveloped or simply the pilots do not know how to use it. The Ka-52 helicopters are equipped with a hull-mounted automatic cannon 2A42 and six pylons allowing for carrying a wide range of weapons. Four of these pylons are for carrying laser-guided anti-tank missile launchers AT-12 Spiral or unguided rocket pods S-8. Meanwhile, the two outer pylons are for carrying air-to-air missiles 9K38 Igla.
The second type of helicopter stationed at the base were the officially introduced into service in 2009 in Russia Mi-28N helicopters. These are already in a classic configuration and are strongly inspired by the AH-64 Apache helicopters. Compared to the Ka-52 Alligator, these are much more heavily armoured (resistant to cannon fire up to 23 mm calibre) but have less firepower (only four pylons) and lack radar.
Now, Russians are using them along with Ka-52 Alligators, which have better target detection capabilities and can provide them protection against other helicopters with air-to-air missiles.
The Russian S-400 Triumph battery system (known as SA-21 Growler in NATO code) was also a target. The system is an evolutionary development of the S-300P units and was introduced into service in 2007. It is a medium-range system that can theoretically engage targets up to about 400 kilometres away using the 40N6E missiles. However, this only applies to aircraft at high altitudes, as defence against ballistic missiles is limited to approximately 60 kilometres.
It is also worth noting that the 40N6E missiles, unlike older ones, have an active radar homing head, meaning the missile itself has a radar emitter and does not have to rely on the fire control radar "illuminating" the target until impact. This allows for significantly increased capability to engage multiple inbound targets from various directions since such a missile operates in a "fire-and-forget" mode.
Russia, however, has few such missiles, and most of them are older solutions where the operator has to illuminate the target with radar until impact. Moreover, the effectiveness of this system against modern Western solutions is not the best, as shown by the cases of engagement with cruise missiles like Storm Shadow or ballistic MGM-140 ATACMS.
