Russia's sanctioned aircraft maintenance loophole exposed

Due to their own shortcomings, Russians are unable to produce modern electronics or even production machinery and have largely relied on components from the West.

However, the sanctions imposed on Russia after February 2022 caused a crisis, which, unfortunately, they have partly managed to overcome. One move was to replace Western electronics with Chinese electronics wherever possible (recently, however, Beijing has been restricting exports to Russia), and the other was to create so-called parallel imports from neighbouring countries not subject to sanctions. The ideal model for Russia in this regard was Iran.

One such case is Kazakhstan, where some distributors of Western companies legally sold banned components to Russia or through a network of smugglers. Unfortunately, the nature of global trade is such that the manufacturer does not exactly know where the produced component will end up, and essentially, the trial ends at the regional distributor offering the goods to stores.

The situation is a bit different regarding military or dual-purpose equipment, where the manufacturer forces distributors to have information about the end customer, including the inspection of the end client. However, as always, the entity or local distributor can falsify documentation in exchange for huge short-term profits. In such cooperation, Russians are forced to pay multiple times the price of a given component or service because they are simply at the mercy of the black market.

This was the case with the Kazakh companies Analyst Research Consulting Group (ARC Group) and JSC Aircraft Repair Plant No. 405, described by the well-known group InformNapalm. These companies were involved in the maintenance and repair of Russian Su-30SM aircraft equipped with components from the French companies Thales and Safran.

In the case of ARC Group, based on documents from 26 August 2022, Russia was supposed to have 13 aircraft repaired for 1.3 million pounds, and in 2023, estimates included the repair of 88 Su-30SM for 5.9 million pounds. Other documents included training Kazakh specialists in handling and repairing Thales equipment in France. Similar contracts pertained to JSC Aircraft Repair Plant No. 405, which was to maintain multifunctional displays SMD55S/SMD66S or HUD3022 collimators.

This is not the first time Russia has used Kazakh companies as a source of sanctioned components. We have already described the case of shipments to Russia of electronic systems or key components of sniper ammunition. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to this problem, and the only thing companies can do is terminate distribution agreements with entities supplying components or services to Russia and implement stricter monitoring of contractors from former Soviet states. Those willing to engage in parallel exports will always be found, but if they regularly face consequences, their numbers may decrease over time due to the high business risk.

The Su-30SM is a multi-role aircraft that is an evolution of the Su-27 fighter jet, with improvements introduced in aerodynamics, avionics, targeting systems, and weaponry. Measuring 21.9 metres in length and boasting a wingspan of 14.6 metres, the twin-engine Su-30SM can serve as both an air superiority fighter and a strike aircraft.

The Su-30SM's advantage is its operational range of about 3,000 kilometres and 12 weapon towers with a total carrying capacity of 8,000 kilogrammes. Air-to-air means include, for example, Vympel R-77 or R-73 missiles and air-to-ground armaments: S-8 unguided rocket pods or Kh-25 missiles. Guided bombs like the FAB-1500 with UMPK module or Kh-59 missiles have a range of over 200 kilometres.

These are very dangerous machines for Ukraine, of which Russia had about 100 units at the time of the full-scale war in Ukraine, and during the fighting, at least 12 machines were lost. It is worth noting that considering Russian logistics, less than half of the aircraft are likely operational.