Russian Su‑57 debuts in China but faces quality scrutiny

The Su-57, Russia's most advanced multi-role aircraft, landed in Zhuhai, China. It is categorized as a 5th-generation post-war aircraft. According to the Russians, it is equivalent to Western machines like the F-35 and F-22 or the Chinese J-20 and J-35.

Upon the Su-57's arrival in China, a video appeared online showing a close-up of the skin of specimen no. 054, which not only falls short of the standards of the modern aerospace industry but also differs from other parts of the aircraft. This means that features related to minimizing the aircraft's detection risk are seriously reduced, as achieving so-called stealth qualities requires immense attention to detail and high-quality workmanship.

In aviation, a combination of stealth features primarily reduces the radar cross-section (RCS) but also decreases thermal or acoustic signatures. For example, in Su-57 054, the first feature is especially important—it is achieved by carefully shaping the airframe (also shielding the engine air intakes or using a set of weapons carried in closed compartments), which disperses the radar beam and by using beam-absorbing paints. As a result, the large aircraft becomes a very small target for most radars, making it more difficult to detect and engage with weapons.

Poorly fitted elements become a reflector that "lights up" the aircraft in the radio band. The video even became a basis for meme creators, who mocked the Russian arms industry by highlighting the quality of these machines. However, it's not entirely fair, as specimen 054 is nothing more than a prototype T-50-4 (besides which, visitors will also see specimen 057/T-50-7 on static display), suggesting the machine could have worn during tests or, due to its experimental nature, might be underdeveloped.

Available photographic material shows that serially produced Su-57s have higher-quality skins, much closer to modern standards. Of course, this does not mean that the PAK-FA program (a program for building a new heavy fighter generation for the Russian Aerospace Forces) is a great success.

Since its inception, the Su-57 has been controversial. While the announcements were optimistic and the plans grand, initially, the Su-57 was somewhat a budget machine built with what was available.

The main proof that the Su-57 is not a "full-fledged" 5th-generation machine was the old AL-41F1 (or S) engines used in serially produced Su-35 aircraft. As recently as 2023, the state corporation Rostec announced the start of the final testing phase of new target engines Izdielielije 30 (ultimately probably AL-51). If the tests are successful, serial production of the new propulsion units will begin in 2025.

Until then, machines with older propulsion will be delivered, although now with "flattened" nozzles reducing RCS. Whether they are deflectable in a vertical plane is unknown. At any rate, they are expected to provide the capability for sustained supersonic flight (so-called supercruise).

By 2028, the Aerospace Forces are expected to receive 76 machines. To date, 10-20 machines have entered service, depending on the source, and the sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and since 2022 likely have a considerable impact on delays. In comparison, Lockheed Martin has delivered nearly 190 F-22 Raptor fighter jets and about 1,000 F-35 Lightning II aircraft in three main versions, with annual production hovering around 150 units.

Suppose one were to compare the potential for confrontation with NATO in the air over a longer term. In that case, one should also add the production capabilities of Dassault Aviation (Rafale), the Eurofighter consortium (Eurofighter 2000/Typhoon), and Sweden's Saab (JAS39 Gripen), which means additional dozens of machines that can be delivered each year. Of course, older Su-35S, Su-34 bombers, etc., are still produced in Russia, but their production does not offset the wear and tear of air forces during wartime.

The Su-57 is not the only example of a new generation of Russian armament programmes that "have an uphill battle." President Vladimir Putin and Anatoly Serdyukov (former Russian Minister of Defence) announced a broad plan to modernize the land forces with entirely new multipurpose platforms in the early last decade.

The plans were ambitious: the introduction of a light, amphibious tracked platform to replace the Soviet-era BMP-2/3 (and several other platforms), a universal wheeled platform 8x8 (successor to the BTR-80) family, and the most advanced heavy platform from which a main battle tank (successor to the T-72/80/90), a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, and a self-propelled howitzer (successor to the 2S19 Msta) would be developed.

Despite demonstrators or prototype vehicles being presented at the Victory Parade in 2015, none of the new platforms entered serial production. Instead of the T-14 Armata tank, Russians produce a simplified T-90M tank (whose production does not ensure replenishing losses), and tanks from the 1950s are removed from storage. Instead of the lighter Kurganets, the BMP-3 is still produced (and not in the most promising versions). Instead of the wheeled Boomerang, Russian soldiers receive modernized BTR-82A (and maybe someday, a new, "budget" transporter).

The Russian industry was overwhelmed by technical and technological challenges. In contrast, the Russian state faced financial difficulties, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine forced the search for more economical but less effective solutions. Numerous modernization programs of the Russian fleet are also experiencing delays. In the air, instead of the PAK-DA (to some extent the Russian response to the American B-21 Raider) strategic heavy aviation programme, the Russian heavy bomber fleet is receiving newly-produced, modernized Tu-160M2 at a rate of three units per year.

Of course, Russia still poses a certain threat to the Western world, but its potential has turned out to be incomparably smaller than that of the Soviet Union, which is unsurprising. Fewer resources, weaker technological infrastructure, rampant corruption, and wastefulness mean that implementing the most ambitious armament programmes similar to those of the USA or China has proven impossible. However, this does not mean that the Kremlin has not tried and is not trying to realize them—it just often leads to scattering and, consequently, squandering the still limited potential of the Russian Federation.