Neglect and tragedy: The Kursk submarine disaster revisited

The K-141 Kursk Submarine was a powerful vessel. If its 155-metre hull were to be placed vertically at the spot where it sank, it would have stuck out above the water's surface like a 14-storey skyscraper.

Unfortunately, the vessel settled flat on the bottom, and those who survived the moment of the disaster waited in vain in the darkness, cold, and increasingly carbon dioxide-saturated air for help.

They were aware that only a miracle could save them. "It's dark, I'm trying to write in the dark. It looks like there is no chance, 10-20 percent. We hope that someone will read this. Below is a list of people from the crew (…) Greetings to all, do not despair. Kolesnikov" – a note with this content was found on the body of one of the officers. The miracle did not happen.

K-141 Kursk was part of an 11-sub series of Project 949A Antey vessels, known by NATO as Oscar II. These are large, nuclear-powered oceanic submarines.

Unlike boomers – large submarines armed with intercontinental missiles, such as the largest in the world, Russian Typhoons or American Ohio-class vessels – the Antey subs were armed with cruise missiles.

Their purpose was to conduct conventional strikes on land and sea targets. Sent into the waters of the world's oceans, the Project 949A submarines were tasked – under Cold War doctrine – with tracking and sinking American aircraft carriers, attacking from underwater to destroy the core of the American fleet.

They were carefully designed for this purpose. The 949A-type vessels were among the largest in the world – with a hull length of 155 metres, they displaced nearly 20,000 tonnes while submerged.

Their main armament consisted of 24 P-700 Granit cruise missile launchers. This is a powerful weapon – Granits are over 10 metres long, weigh 7 tonnes, and can reach targets up to 550 kilometres away, flying at speeds exceeding Mach 2.5, carrying a large 3/4-tonne warhead.

In addition to the P-700 missiles, the submarines were equipped with torpedoes and rocket torpedoes launched from torpedo tubes against submarines, including the RPK-6 Vodopad with a range exceeding 100 kilometres.

The hulls were made of amagnetic steel, with their light, submersible part separated from the solid hull by several inches of rubber, which improved the vessel's soundproofing. An Antey-class submarine could dive to at least 600 metres, reach an impressive underwater speed of 32 knots, and have a crew of 100-120 people.

One of the vessels of this type was the K-141 Kursk. On 10 August, the vessel left port to participate in exercises with other ships of the Northern Fleet. On 12 August, the Kursk's crew began a 14-hour cycle of practice torpedo firings, which included simulating an attack on an aircraft carrier.

The last communication received from the Kursk was at 08:30 GMT – the vessel reported a successful practice attack on a group of ships. At 11:30 GMT, a strong underwater explosion was recorded on the cruiser Peter the Great. Despite detecting the underwater explosion, it was completely disregarded.

Since the Kursk did not establish communication all day – including the last scheduled check-in at 17:30 GMT – it was assumed that the submarine had a malfunction. The next day, on 13 August, a Russian cruiser’s sonar detected the submarine on the seabed. At that time – contrary to official reports – everyone on board was already dead.

Moscow initially denied the catastrophe. Officially, it was stated that the submarine malfunctioned but that the crew was receiving air and food. When rescue submersibles reached the submarine, they failed to connect with the sunken Kursk due to technical problems. Initially, the Russians also – as in the case of the K-278 Komsomolets disaster – refused international help, accepting it only when it was far too late.

Some light on the events in the Barents Sea was shed not by the official, often misleading reports but by the private investigation conducted after the disaster by Russian Admiral Valery Ryazantsev.

This experienced submarine commander, with 28 years of service as a member of the commission investigating the catastrophe, had access to all documents. Ryazantsev's findings are shocking.

According to the admiral's document-supported findings, the Kursk never underwent a full cycle of trials. Its crew was never fully trained, and the weaponry loaded onto the submarine before the last manoeuvres were handled improperly.

Mandatory maintenance was also neglected. Signatures in key installations' inspection and repair protocols, such as the technical air supply, were falsified.

As a result, debris entered the training torpedo, which was filled with unpurified air before launch. Combined with improper torpedo preparation for firing, these contaminants entered the oxidiser (hydrogen peroxide) and kerosene tanks, causing a violent oxidiser decomposition, releasing significant heat, and, consequently, increased pressure and the first explosion.

It killed part of the crew, damaged the control room, and disconnected the nuclear propulsion system. Previously travelling at a shallow, periscope depth, the submarine began to descend, heavily tilted forward. These were critical seconds during which a properly trained crew could have attempted to save the submarine, but none of the officers issued such an order.

When the bow of the Kursk hit the seabed, another explosion of stored torpedoes occurred, resulting in the death of most of the crew. Twenty-three officers and sailors from the rear compartments of the submarine survived.

"There are 23 people in the compartment 0. Feeling bad. Weak from CO exposure. W-64 (oxygen-generating containers) are running out. We won't survive decompression when surfacing. Lacking belts (…) lacking carabiners (…). We will hold on for just under a day" – wrote Lieutenant Captain Sergey Sadilenko.

Initially, the survivors planned to evacuate through the emergency exit. Still, due to the darkness, the state of some injured sailors, and the awareness that they might not survive the evacuation, they decided to wait for help. They could have been convinced that help would come quickly because the Kursk sank almost in view of the entire Northern Fleet. Moreover, in such a case, an automatic lifebuoy should have detached from the submarine, indicating the location of the disaster to rescuers.

It didn’t detach. It couldn’t. It had been welded to the submarine to prevent it from being lost.