Kremlin's crumbling influence: The fallout from Syria's collapse

Tatiana Kolesnychenko: Over the past ten years, Russia has invested considerable resources into bolstering Bashar al-Assad's regime. Yet, in less than two weeks, the Kremlin's "Syrian project" crumbled like a house of cards. Can we speak of Putin's failure?

Ivan Preobrazhensky: Regarding building influence in the Middle East, yes. This is a failure for the Kremlin. It derived from several critical mistakes.

Which mistakes?

Firstly, the exclusive military alliance with Iran. The Kremlin believed it was a beneficial arrangement because Iran supported Russia in Ukraine by supplying drones. However, by no longer manoeuvring between Sunnis and Shiites, Moscow failed to notice that it was losing other influential allies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The result was that the interests of Iran, not so much Russia, were prioritised in the region. When Putin initiated the invasion of Ukraine, he had to rely solely on Tehran because the Russian army couldn't seriously support Assad.

Another turning point was allowing Yevgeny Prigozhin to transform Russian military bases in Syria into a logistical hub for the Wagner Group, serving as a springboard for further operations in Africa, where Russia had established a significant presence.

According to some analysts, a crucial factor in Assad's regime collapse was the lack of support from his key allies. Russia is embroiled in the war in Ukraine, and Iran - as you mentioned in one of your articles - has effectively lost its network of influence in the Middle East. But the final failure was cemented by the absence of Prigozhin, who had built the entire logistics network. After his demise, the empire he created was divided and fragmented.

I think Prigozhin's absence had a very significant impact on recent events. He managed to establish a foothold in Syria, facilitating influence in Africa. The Kremlin is now merely reaping the benefits of the Wagner Group's achievements. Prigozhin was able to make radical decisions, build mafia connections, and negotiate with African and Middle Eastern rulers and warlords, who often themselves constituted criminal or semi-criminal structures. Consider Assad, whom Prigozhin likely worked with on drug trade and smuggling.

With Prigozhin gone, Russia attempted to sustain the remnants of the Wagner empire. It created the so-called African Corps, which was neither a state nor a commercial military structure. Simultaneously, Russia heavily invested and engaged in the African region, notably in the Sahel (the southern edge of the Sahara, spanning from Senegal to Eritrea, through Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan - ed.). Therein lie Russian companies' financial interests and commitments to Chinese businesses, which these semi-private structures were intended to protect.

Now it all hangs in the balance.

Because the future of Russian bases in Syria is uncertain? Moscow had a 49-year lease on the airbase in Hmeimim and the naval base in Tartus. Reports suggest that some equipment and personnel have already been evacuated. On the one hand, rebel leaders say Russian bases are not under threat, but on the other - Russian flags are being stepped on and burnt.

After the Wagner Group openly showed - because they filmed it - the dismemberment of Syrians, it is no surprise that many dislike Russia's presence. Moscow aided Assad in perpetrating, if not genocide - since it didn't target a specific ethnic or national group - then at least the destruction of the local population. Such actions are not easily forgotten.

Conversely, it's unclear how susceptible the new Syrian authorities will be to corruption. There is little hope they will resist corruption, just as there's no expectation of transparent or democratic governance. It is unlikely the so-called secular opposition, which originally instigated the protests against Assad in 2011, will now play a significant role. Thus, Russia might bribe the new government to maintain the bases in Syria. However, it will still not be a secure refuge for the Kremlin.

While it may be possible to defend the port of Tartus until complete evacuation, securing the airbase in Hmeimim is problematic. Even if the Kremlin retains the bases, it will still seek an additional, secure haven in the region.

Such as where?

That remains the essential question. The only potential option is Libya, where a simmering civil war involves pro-Russian forces. However, reaching there requires another transhipment base. Where might that be? Perhaps Turkey or Azerbaijan. Yet, I cannot envisage any of these countries agreeing to it.

Will Russia consequently lose its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

This will entail a series of repercussions. Firstly, the Kremlin cannot honour its commitments to African regimes expecting support. This encompasses a whole group of military juntas oriented towards Moscow. There will also be an issue with China, for whom Russia acts as a protector and aide in Africa.

Moreover, it is a severe blow to Russia's image. The Kremlin spent significant effort forging a reputation as an anti-colonial power, battling old empires exploiting Africa. The Soviet Union once pursued similar policies. With a foothold in Africa, Russia anticipated that it would further expand its influence over the so-called Global South (countries in Africa, Asia, or South America).

Assad asked for help, but Moscow refused. Is this a signal to other dictators that the Kremlin shouldn't be trusted?

The situation here is more complicated. Russia straightforwardly signals, and - interestingly - Iran echoes it, that Assad is to blame because he attempted to betray them. According to the Kremlin, when Assad encountered problems, he covertly sought connections with the West through Persian Gulf countries instead of relying on his allies - Russia and Iran - he covertly sought connections with the West. The West didn't assist Assad, which led to his regime's fall.

And yet Russia provided asylum to Assad and his family.

It appears no one else wanted them. Nevertheless, the Kremlin unmistakably signals that the Syrian regime's downfall was punishment for betrayal. It tries to mask the obvious fact with this distorted narrative that neither Iran nor Russia had the strength or resources to aid Assad.

The conclusion is meant to be straightforward: don't switch sides. But does the Kremlin's version seem credible to African countries and their warlords?

I strongly doubt it. This version is very convenient for the Kremlin, but there is another one: Assad attempted to betray his allies when he realised that no one would come to his aid.

If this perspective takes hold, it will be a serious blow to Russia's reputation, as it portrays itself as a power that supports all authoritarian regimes and is always ready to assist when these regimes confront the West or suppress democratic revolutions.

Thus, Russia will need to reinvent its external image as it no longer matches the previous one. In addition, it's a financial blow, as Russia had very lucrative contracts in Africa, including oil extraction. Most importantly, Russia now finds itself in the same situation it placed the West in during recent years.

How so?

Russia created a series of issues by sowing chaos in countries where the West had some influence, which weakened it economically. France is a good example, having been ousted by Russia from Africa. Now, the Kremlin finds itself in that role, as its foreign projects collapse and it doesn't possess the strength to maintain all fronts. Consequently, the Kremlin loses its role as a dealer of instability and fear. This image was actively marketed to the West. Putin expected that, with Trump as president, the influence of Syria and Russia in the Middle East would serve as a pretext for normalising relations. Now, that influence is lost.

Russia's withdrawal from Syria might not directly impact the front in Ukraine, yet it could significantly alter the diplomatic landscape. How so?

The most significant aspect has already happened. It concerns the psychological effect. Fortunately, as Assad's regime collapsed, there was a meeting between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, organised by French President Emmanuel Macron. Essentially, it was an informal summit after which Trump made a pivotal statement. Paraphrasing: "Look, Vladimir Putin, you were defeated in Syria, and you might suffer a similar defeat in Ukraine. So better think and start negotiating."

This was a statement from a position of strength, and the Kremlin reacted nervously because it realised that, from a public point of view, the situation had suddenly and significantly altered.

Russia no longer appears strong and omnipotent?

Indeed, it doesn't. That's the twist. Putin is not yet losing the war in Ukraine, but Russia has ceased being perceived as a geopolitical power. Now, we should expect that Moscow will launch another terrorist attack in Ukraine, strike some vulnerable locations with missiles, to project strength anew and spread fear and terror.

It's all about creating the impression that the situation is so grim that concessions and negotiations with the Kremlin are necessary. Everyone knows that talks are inevitable eventually, but the question is what atmosphere will prevail at the negotiating table. The Kremlin will no longer be able to speak from a position of strength.