Iran's nuclear ambitions and Israel's response. A dangerous standoff

Immediately after the Israeli strike on Iran, local media reassuringly reported that "nuclear facilities in the Ishafan province remained intact". Shortly afterwards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published a similar statement, emphasising that nuclear facilities should never be a target of attack.

The IAEA's reservation was justified. Until the Russian attack on Ukraine and the attacks on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Israel was the only country in the world that had ever deliberately attacked a nuclear infrastructure and, moreover, did it twice.

The first of the Israeli attacks - carried out during a perfectly executed raid as part of Operation Opera in 1981 destroyed the Iraqi reactor Tammuz 1 (Osirak), thwarting Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapon plans. The second Israeli attack took place in 2007. The target of Operation Orchard was a Syrian reactor in the Deir ez-Zor region.

For this reason, a rise in tension between Iran and Israel was a reason for concern that Israeli retaliation would target Iranian nuclear facilities. However, this did not happen, and military targets in the Ishafan area were attacked instead.

The Iranian nuclear programme has been a nightmare for Western leaders for years. It's worth recalling that its foundations - like in the case of Iraq or Syria - were built by the West itself.

The American "Atoms for Peace" programme initiated in the 1950s envisaged broad access to nuclear energy for civilian uses. It also proposed what turned out to be a dead-end of technical development, the introduction of nuclear agriculture and mining, where, as part of Operation Plowshare, attempts were made to create retention basins or open-pit mines with nuclear explosions.

One of the effects of the "Atoms for Peace" programme was the delivery of the first reactor to Iran by the United States in the 1960s, powered by highly enriched uranium, the creation of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), and the launch of a nuclear research centre in Tehran.

German companies started building other reactors—for the needs of a nuclear power plant—in Iran and France to ensure uranium supply. Iran's massive use of nuclear energy was supposed to release world market oil reserves, which were to no longer serve as an energy raw material for oil-producing Iran.

The situation changed after the Islamic Revolution. Due to pressures from Washington, not only American companies but also European ones withdrew from agreements paid by Iran, which turned Tehran towards cooperation with South Africa (this country developed nuclear weapons but voluntarily gave them up) and Pakistan.

Iran's breakthrough, however, was its cooperation with Russia in the 1990s. Russia began to supply nuclear energy experts and missile technology specialists, resulting in a rapid acceleration of Iranian work in both areas.

The results were not long in coming. At the beginning of the century, the discovery of Iranian research centres in Arak, where heavy water was being produced, and in Natanz, where uranium was being enriched, started a long period of tension, during which the West tried to persuade Iran to cease operations diplomatically.

When diplomacy failed, computer viruses such as the Stuxnet worm, which likely damaged Iranian centrifuges used for producing enriched uranium at the beginning of the last decade, infected hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide, disrupting, among other things, the Indian space programme or the functioning of the Chinese industry.

Rumours of the short time separating Iran from developing its nuclear weapons go hand in hand with other speculations: how long will Israel tolerate such a situation and when it will decide to attack, which – similarly to the raid on the Osirak reactor – would at least slow down the plans of a hostile country.

Meanwhile, Iran openly declared two years ago the commencement of enriching possessed uranium to a content of 60 per cent of isotope U-235. Although this is not enough for military needs, this value significantly exceeds the 20 per cent the IAEA allows for civilian uses.

For this reason, the openly conducted preparations of Israel are not surprising. Even in 2022, its air forces, as part of the "Chariots of Fire" manoeuvres, conducted simulated attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

Another type of exercise—using flying tankers—prepares Israeli air personnel to perform a task that involves a long flight over a distance exceeding 1500 km in one direction.

In this case, an important advantage for Israel is the F-35I Adir aircraft, the only foreign version of this design. Developed with Israeli avionics and integrated with Israeli armament, these aircraft have repeatedly proved their supremacy over a potential opponent, executing, for example, undisturbed flights over the capital of Syria, Damascus.

If Israeli authorities decide to destroy Iranian nuclear installations, it can be assumed that these machines will either lead or protect the attack.

Israeli preparations gain additional context when we analyse the consequences of a recent missile and drone attack carried out by Iran. Its repulsion – with the help of Israel and international aviation – is presented as a great success, and indeed it is.

However, overshadowed by impressive statistics, the fact that the emphasis on the "99-percent effectiveness" of defensive systems means that a few Iranian ballistic missiles breached the Israeli defence.

Their conventional warheads did not cause significant damage. However, if even one of them had carried a nuclear charge, the balance of the clash, assessed today as an Israeli success, would have been tragic for Israel.