Georgia's foreign agents law sparks debate, protests ensue

The Georgian parliament has passed a law on the transparency of foreign influences, also known as the "foreign agents law." Its provisions raise concerns among Georgians and foreign institutions because they are similar to those in force in Russia.

The law provides, among other things, that legal entities and media receiving more than 20 per cent of their funding from abroad will be subject to registration and reporting. They will be entered into a special register of foreign influence agents. The Ministry of Justice can conduct audits of such organizations on any pretext.

The country's president, Salome Zurabishvili—currently openly conflicted with the ruling Georgian Dream party, though initially elected with its recommendation—has already announced that she will veto it. She emphasized that it stands in the way of her country's European aspirations. However, the ruling party has a majority that will allow it to override her veto.

In December 2023, Georgia attained the status of a candidate country for EU membership, but the law tracking "foreign agents" puts Tbilisi's relations with Brussels on the line. Why did the Georgian Dream pull it out of the drawer (they tried to pass it a year earlier but buckled under protests)?

Wojciech Górecki, a former diplomat and chief analyst at the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) for Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, tells money.pl that there is no clear answer.

He points out that NGOs are also affected by the new regulations. Because they are funded from abroad and monitor the government's actions, they are considered to favour the opposition.

We can assume that it is most likely about greater control over the flow of money and the financing of civil society, but also greater social control ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for late October. According to polls, the Georgian Dream is expected to win them, but most likely they want the largest possible victory that will guarantee a constitutional majority and the ability to elect the president – says Wojciech Górecki.

The expert explains that Georgia recently changed its laws. The president is no longer elected in general elections but by a college of parliamentarians and representatives of local governments. However, he emphasizes that this is just one theory explaining the government's decision to pass the controversial law.

Georgians have been protesting against the law for weeks. Local media claimed last Sunday’s demonstration in Tbilisi might have been the largest "in modern history" of the country. It reportedly drew up to 200,000 people.

The protesters are organizing independently and are not affiliated with the opposition, as previously suggested by those in power. On the contrary, politicians are "joining" the protests.

Prime Minister Irakli Kobachidze suggested that he is ready to soften the course and introduce amendments to the law following a potential veto, although the president announced that she would not negotiate with the government on this matter.

The US and the EU sharply reacted to the law. Washington threatened sanctions, and Brussels condemned the parliament's decision. A group of 31 MEPs earlier called for halting Georgia's accession process.

This is a symbolic moment of civilizational choice that Georgia faces. Does it want to integrate with the Russian, post-Soviet legal civilization with a drift towards authoritarianism, or does it want to continue its journey to Europe – said Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski on Wednesday.

There was also another diplomatic spat. The leader of the ruling party and oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who practically leads the verdict camp, ostentatiously refused to meet in Tbilisi with US Deputy Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia James O’Brien. Instead, only the prime minister met with him.

Georgians have long been supporters of EU accession. According to surveys, about 80 per cent of the population supports this step. OSW experts caution against thinking it is a confrontation between a pro-Russian government and pro-Western citizens. The situation is more complicated.

Georgian Dream, which has been in power since 2012, pushed through constitutional changes in 2018 stating that the country's goal is EU and NATO membership. Important changes have also taken place under this government, such as the right of Georgians to enter the EU without visas and the signing of an association agreement. Finally, under the rule of this party, Georgia gained candidate status for the EU – Górecki enumerates.

The country's reorientation towards the West happened at the end of the 20th century. At that time, the then authorities realized that Russia, as a partner, was more likely to block Georgia’s development than to support it.

However, it should be noted that the numerous protests only involve a portion of society. The majority is conservative and not accustomed to the Western way of life.

Why does the EU need Georgia? The analyst responds that Brussels needs democratizing states in the region to create a "democratic security belt" to protect the EU from Russia.

The problem is that Georgia borders Russia and does not border any member state. This issue is often overlooked, and we forget that, for instance, a Georgian farmer growing citrus fruits and wanting to sell them abroad finds Russia the obvious direction. Firstly, it is closest, and secondly – it is a receptive market – Górecki observes.

The EU is Georgia's largest trading partner, accounting for about 23 percent of all Georgian imports and 15 percent of exports in 2022. In 2022, imports from the EU from the Caucasus country were worth around £900 million (about £650 million in 2023), and exports—£2.8 billion (reaching nearly £3 billion the following year).

However, we are talking about a community of 27 countries. With slightly lower trade metrics, Russia is one country and, thus, the primary recipient of goods from Georgia. Georgian agricultural products (mainly citrus fruits), wine, and metals, such as manganese, are sold there – the expert lists.

Górecki reminds us that Georgia is a transit route for Caspian hydrocarbons as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines and the South Caucasus Pipeline run through its territory. The EU uses these to import resources from Azerbaijan, bypassing Russia.

Despite Moscow and Tbilisi having no diplomatic relations since 2008 (the moment Russia invaded Georgia), a certain "thaw" is evident. In May 2023, the two countries resumed air traffic suspended for nearly four years, accompanied by the Kremlin's decision to lift visas for Georgians.

Several tens of thousands of Russians emigrated to Georgia following the announcement of general mobilization in their country. In response, Georgia shortened their wait time for citizenship from 10 to 5 years.

Georgia buys energy resources from Russia, there is air traffic, and there is a visa-free regime between the two countries. This works in Moscow's favour, regardless of Tbilisi's intentions, as it provides a "window" to the outside world – Górecki points out.

A separate issue is the figure of Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream. He came from a poor family but made billions during the privatization of the Russian economy.

He operated in the electronics, industry, agriculture, construction, and real estate sectors. At one point, he also held shares in Gazprom and Lukoil. "Forbes" estimates his net worth at £4 billion.

In 2002, he returned to Georgia, where he initially supported Mikheil Saakashvili. Nine years later, he got involved in politics himself. In 2012, he became prime minister but stepped down a year later and stopped managing the party.

He took control of the Georgian Dream again in 2018 and has been leading the country from behind the scenes since then.