Europe's military awakening: From complacency to rearmament drive

Europe passively observed the rearmament of Nazi Germany. It had plenty of time to strengthen its defence potential but did not use that time. Today, Ukraine, fighting against Russia, is providing that time. The question is whether Europe will take advantage of it.

The time of pacifism and demilitarisation is over—a new arms race began after Russia's attack on Ukraine. It took Europe an exceptionally long time to understand this. It wasn't until late 2023, nearly two years after the Russian aggression, that serious joint arms programmes began.

It is gaining momentum slowly, even though Russian military and politicians are announcing that "Ukraine is just a stage," and when they are finished with it, they will move further. American and European analysts estimate about five years for this potential time to fulfil the announcements. That's exactly how long it will take Putin to rebuild his army's potential.

NATO European countries have critical shortages of sufficient artillery systems. They started to get rid of them because they thought that after the fall of the USSR, regular land warfare with widespread use of artillery was no longer a threat on the continent. In the early 1990s, the German army had 570 self-propelled M109 howitzers, the Netherlands had 126, and Belgium had 231. Meanwhile, the British had 179 AS90s.

Gradually, Germany completely got rid of the M109, replacing them with 185 PzH2000 units, initially. In February 2022, they had 108 units left. The Dutch replaced the M109 with 57 German howitzers, half of which went to Ukraine. Belgium currently has no barrel artillery. The British had around 90 AS90s in three incomplete regiments, with a third of them sent to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation had over 2,000 self-propelled artillery systems before the Ukraine war began. Even with losses of about 25%, Russia still has significantly more barrels than all European NATO countries combined.

The situation is even worse in terms of artillery ammunition production. Russia produces about three times more shells and is estimated to do so 75% cheaper than European countries. Currently, they produce 3 million units per year. Of course, the lower price translates to quality. Experiences from Ukraine show that Russians need to use about ten times more ammunition to accomplish the same combat task.

Western shells are much more accurate. Unfortunately, current annual production from the European industry would only last for barely two weeks of warfare at the intensity observed in Ukraine. Although in recent weeks, the number of shells fired daily by Russians has dropped from 60,000 to 10,000, Ukrainians can only fire about 2,000.

All of NATO produces 1.2 million units annually, with nearly half coming from the United States.

For this reason, in mid-March, the European Union decided to allocate 500 million euros to accelerate ammunition production. This is intended to increase production to 2 million units by the end of 2025. It's a culmination of the EU's decision to implement the European Defence Industry Strategy, which sets goals for the defence industry until 2035.

As early as 2007, the EU assumed that 33% of equipment for European NATO armies would be produced by member countries. This goal was not achieved, as it is currently only 18%. The latest assumptions now state that up to 50% of defence spending should go to the European industry, with 40% of new products being developed in cooperation with EU countries. The goal is to strengthen the European defence industry and make it competitive in global markets.

This will also encourage countries that do not produce their own ammunition but assemble it from imported components to join the process of building a joint defence industry.

Similar to the artillery situation, European countries have almost entirely lost the ability to produce tanks. Currently, production lines are only located in Germany. Poland, the UK, and France may join shortly, although all these countries will have to import tank cannons.

In the early 1990s, Germany could produce over 30 vehicles per month. Today, such a number is a dream. Currently, European capabilities for armoured weapon production are minimal. Theoretically, up to 40 units per year can roll off the production lines, the same number that Russia produces monthly.

The worst situation is in the UK, which literally tore down its Royal Ordnance Factory armour plants in Leeds and Elswick in Newcastle upon Tyne, where Challenger tanks were produced. Theoretically, there is a possibility to rebuild production capacities at existing Babcock Defence Support Group and Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land plants, but no political decision has been made.

Italy has similarly lost its capability by scrapping the Ariete tank production line. There's no sign of building a new one due to high costs. The French have an easier path with their preserved production line at Atelier de Construction de Roanne, but restarting production would still be too expensive for small series production to be profitable.

Given NATO's small armoured reserves, rebuilding production capabilities would be the wisest step. The question is, how much cost are European politicians and societies willing to bear?

Currently, Europe theoretically has enough time to start rearming and adapt its armies to changing geopolitical conditions. Russia's involvement in Ukraine is so significant that the Kremlin cannot wage another conflict.

For this reason, NATO should expand its capabilities and primarily support Ukraine. Fighting Russia gives the West time to rebuild military capabilities and expand the defence industry. Europe has shaken off its lethargy and is gradually ramping up arms production. The only question is whether the politicians will have enough determination.