Destruction at Dawn. The fall of Ukraine's key energy pillar
On the night of April 10th, 2024, Russians destroyed the Trypilska TPP power plant near Kyiv. This facility used, among other things, technology developed by a Polish company. We present the specifications of one of the two largest conventional power plants in Ukraine and the possible consequences of this action.
The attacked power plant supplied electricity to the Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions, among others, and was one of the two largest facilities of this type in Ukraine. This coal and gas-powered facility with a capacity of 1800 MW was the main energy source for the Kyiv region after the shutdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
Initially, the Trypilska TPP had 4 power units, each with a capacity of 300 MW, but it was later decided to build two more. It is worth noting that block no. 2 was also equipped with a system for removing sulphur oxides and fly ash in a "semi-dry" technology developed by the Polish company Rafako.
The destruction of the power plant is a very serious blow to the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which has become one of the priority targets for the Russians.
What the Russians could have used to attack
The attack on the power plant was most likely carried out using a ballistic missile because if missiles from the Kh-101 and Kh-55/555 families or Shahed drones had been manoeuvred, the damage could have been less. Moreover, Ukrainians are quite proficient in dealing with such targets.
To protect against them, it suffices to deploy quite numerous mobile response teams with man-portable air-defence systems like the Polish Piorun or the American FIM-92 Stinger in the protected sector. This weapon, combined with a greater range battery of the NASAMS system, can easily deal with targets moving at a speed of about Mach 1 (1,225 km/h). However, these kits are helpless against ballistic missiles or supersonic manoeuvring missiles moving at speeds exceeding Mach 3 (3,675 km/h).
For the hypersonic Ch-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, S-300/400 missile systems, Ch-22 manoeuvring missiles, and Iskander-M ballistic missiles, the only defence could be provided by medium-range systems like S-300, Patriot, or SAMP/T, of which Ukraine currently has too few.
There are no more missiles for the post-Soviet systems, and—what is worse—there are only a few places in the world where they can be sourced. The characteristics of these systems against ballistic missiles mean that their actual range against such targets is about 40 kilometres from the launcher.
Such complexes are needed by Ukraine to protect key infrastructure in cities and to combat aircraft carrying glide bombs from a distance of over 100 kilometres at the front line. Kyiv must, therefore, make very difficult choices regarding which facilities should be protected. The situation cannot be improved by delivering more medium-range systems, which the United Kingdom, among others, is striving for.
