Assessing the durability of Western tanks in Ukraine's conflict landscape

Russians boast about every destroyed Western vehicle. For them, it's a significant propaganda success, so Kremlin media even record the hits themselves. How much of these losses can be attributed to the Ukrainians and how much to the flaws of Western equipment?

During last year's counteroffensive, the Russians published numerous photos of damaged, and especially completely destroyed tanks. So far, photographs and videos have confirmed the irreversible loss of about 10 Leopards. In total, more than 20 German-made tanks were damaged and lost.

Most were damaged by mines. After replacing the tracks and undercarriage components, they returned to the front. However, equipment losses globally do not exceed 19 percent, which is acceptable, considering the conditions under which Ukrainian soldiers had to fight.

The conditions in which Ukrainian soldiers have fought are incomparable to those in which NATO armies have fought so far. Polish generals estimated during staff exercises that losses, when attacking fortified positions, could even exceed 30 percent of the engaged equipment.

Ukrainians made several mistakes then, leading to losses. Above all, they sent tanks into battle without the protection of armoured vehicles or infantry, resulting in significant equipment losses. Fortunately, Western equipment is solid enough that personal losses were minimal.

The doctrine of designing vehicles in Western countries prioritises the highest level of crew protection from injuries. As a result, Western vehicles are usually larger and heavier than those designed in the USSR or Russia. Thanks to this approach, the crews of infantry fighting vehicles and tanks have a good chance of surviving even in the event of a direct hit.

As the Russians boasted a year ago about destroying Leopards, in recent weeks they have published recordings of hit Abrams tanks. However, they have not managed to permanently eliminate any of the M1 Abrams so far. This is primarily due to the construction of these vehicles.

The main structural difference, which contributes to the crew's survivability, is the location of the ammunition magazine. In Western vehicles, the ammunition is stored in an armoured citadel at the rear of the turret, separated by an explosive-proof partition, which has only a window through which the loader retrieves the projectile and propellant charge.

In tanks designed during the USSR era, the ammunition magazine consists of carousel containers in the shape of a ring, located under the turret. Since Russian tanks use separate loading, projectiles and propellant charges are stored separately in the containers. In the T-72 family tanks, the crew sits above the magazine, whereas in the T-64 family tanks, the crew sits inside the ring.

The biggest disadvantage of this design is its poor protection against anti-tank projectiles penetration. Any hull breach risks an explosion of propellant charges, which are not only located in the carousel but also in almost every free space inside the vehicle. Hence the large losses of Russian armoured crews.

This was especially visible in the case of side hits. With Russian tanks, often a single hit by an anti-tank guided missile caused a chain reaction and the turret to be blown off. For Western vehicles, not only is the armour stronger, but the structural solutions also protect the crew.

The Ukrainians recently lost an M1A1SA Abrams, which was struck twice by a Kornet missile. After the first hit, the crew continued operations and fired at targets. Only the second projectile caused enough damage that the crew decided to evacuate. However, the vehicle was still suitable for evacuation and repair.

The Ukrainians are still faced with significant training challenges. An old military saying goes, a tank is only as good as its crew's training. It's clear that the crews of Ukrainian tanks are not well-trained. This is evident from videos published online, showing that they fire from unprepared exposed positions and do not change position after firing, exposing the vehicle to destruction.

This was the case with the loss of the third Abram by the 47th Independent Mechanized Brigade near Berdyansk, where vehicles lacked any support or protection, which is absolutely unacceptable. The problem stems from bad habits from reserve officers, who have been mobilized in the last two years.

Indeed, they have now been trained in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany. However, it's still a soldier whose first habits were acquired 15 years ago. Often not only Western trainers mention this, but also younger Ukrainian soldiers. Therefore, absurdly senseless losses also occur on the Ukrainian side of the front. And they will continue to happen. It's good that Western equipment is quite solid.