USAF's next-gen fighter plans face turbulence: consider slimmed-down f‑35

In the first half of July, the United States Air Force (USAF) announced that the NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance) fighter program might face financial problems due to budget constraints for the 2025 fiscal year. Although the US Armed Forces are the wealthiest service of this kind in the world, they still cannot freely use financial resources as if there were no limits.

Therefore, USAF Secretary Frank Kendall stated that the future NGAD might require programme reorganisation and changes in technical requirements to reduce costs. To recap, one future 6th generation fighter is expected to cost £240 million. For comparison, the contemporary lighter F-35A costs almost £80 million.

One way to cut costs is to give up the expensive (£3.53 billion until 2023) revolutionary NGAP (Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion) engine, which is planned to have high performance with low fuel consumption.

Despite the enormous challenges associated with the B-21 Raider (new strategic bomber) programme and LGM-35A Sentinel (new intercontinental ballistic missile – both are to form two of the three segments of the American nuclear triad), the USAF must retain the ability to continue the equally important NGAD programme. Currently, however, the verification of some requirements has been somewhat frozen.

Kendall stated that simpler, cheaper solutions in some areas, or compromises, are necessary. Thanks to this, NGAD would avoid the fate of the F-22A Raptor, also a revolutionary machine. In that case, costs reduced the order from 750 to less than 200 units. The Raptor was to replace the more numerous F-15, but the ageing Eagle is still in production, and the innovative machine is not.

The NGAD is not so much an aircraft (referred to as the NGAD platform) as an entire system – the next-generation fighter is to operate in a complex ecosystem, supported by various types of drones, cooperating with other manned aircraft (especially the F-35) and support planes (AWACS, etc.). In this regard, there could also be some simplifications.

So far, it has not been announced which capabilities the successor to the F-22 might forgo. This is probably the main subject of ongoing arrangements and consultations. It is a glimmer of hope, as in June some Pentagon representatives predicted the possible end of the NGAD programme for financial reasons.

Nonetheless, the USAF must prepare for the potential effects of possibly giving up the efficient (20-25% less fuel consumption) NGAP engines, especially in the face of challenges requiring large ranges in the Pacific theatre of operations. Some American commentators consider re-engining in the future as possible, for example, using Rolls-Royce engines.

It is worth noting that the potential abandonment of NGAD could lead to an exceptionally dangerous situation for American manufacturing capabilities. The USAF could end up with only one company designing and producing fighters: Lockheed Martin. NGAD (and the similar F/A-XX, successor to the F/A-18 Super Hornet) was supposed to be an opportunity for other manufacturers, especially Boeing, which is already struggling with other problems.

At the end of July, USAF Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin presented the concept of a lighter machine, referred to as "build to adept," meaning ease of introducing modifications as needed. This is just a theoretical concept of a light fighter (actually a multi-role aircraft), about which little is known except that in its case, adaptability to new battlefield conditions is to be more important than high survivability (so important for many older machines, but also NGAD).

Gen. Allvin suggested the necessity of widely using digital engineering and 3D printing during the development and production of the new aircraft. The aeroplane in the conceptual drawing strongly resembles the F-25, maintaining its overall structural layout, except for differently configured air intakes and, most likely, smaller dimensions.

It would still be quite an advanced machine, but much cheaper. Thanks to this, the aircraft could be replaced with a more modern variant (or even model) more often than today at similar costs. Furthermore, it would allow the mass introduction of the aircraft into service, increasing the overall size of the USAF’s combat component – this is supposed to be the answer to the relatively numerous Chinese Air Force.

The idea is not new by any means. Regarding the possibility of relatively fast replacement or at least easy modernisation of the aircraft, this is how NGAD started – according to one early concept, the F-22 was to be replaced by many not very numerous types of highly specialised machines. According to the then US Air Force leadership, this was supposed to allow, among other things, cost reduction, which even then (around 2020) did not sound very credible.

The idea of a lighter fighter, complementing the "workhorse" F-35 and the "top" NGAD, is also not new. In 2021, the USAF expressed the need to purchase a "generation 4.5" fighter that would be cheap enough to replace the mass-produced F-16s (unfortunately not managed within the F-35 programme). On the other hand, this aircraft would offer sufficient performance even for future battlefields (an open mission system architecture was required, for example).

The natural candidate seemed to be the trainer Boeing/Saab T-7 Red Hawk, which could become the basis for the development of a light combat machine (just as the Korean KAI FA-50 is derived from the T-50 trainer). Still, so far, the USAF has not expressed interest in such a solution. It appears that the USAF wants an aircraft that is simultaneously a genuine combat aircraft and yet cheaper – in a way, that aircraft was supposed to be the F-35A, and despite exceeding the original financial assumptions due to the excessive complexity of the JSF programme (especially version F-35B is costly), it almost managed to achieve this.

Can you have your cake and eat it too? No, but perhaps the USAF will manage to find a reasonable compromise over time, as long as the lighter fighter programme is not abandoned before it even starts. Experiences from the past do not inspire optimism.

The idea of a light, cheap fighter jet is certainly potentially attractive, as at significantly lower costs, the user receives only slightly lower capabilities, at least on paper. Thus, it is not surprising that this concept repeatedly returns like a boomerang and almost always ends in two ways: those who could, preferred to buy genuine combat aircraft, and those who bought light and cheap fighters ended poorly in combat.