Syria's power shift: A blow to Putin's global ambitions

Bashar al-Assad, who weathered the Arab Spring and the civil war by brutally repressing his nation, suddenly lost power in just twelve days. He was forced to flee Damascus and seek refuge in Moscow, where Putin granted asylum to him and his family.

The collapse of al-Assad is also a substantial blow to the Russian president. It undermines him not only in terms of image at a pivotal time—when a change in the U.S. administration could have presented Russia with opportunities for a new approach to the Ukraine conflict. Yet, the downfall of Russia's ally in the Middle East does not necessarily simplify matters for Ukraine.

Russia's global ambitions were asserted with its 2015 involvement in the Syrian conflict. A year following the annexation of Crimea and backing "separatists" in Donbas, Russia raised the stakes by intervening militarily beyond the borders of the former Soviet sphere for the first time.

Two years later, Putin declared victory in Syria. The support provided by Russian air forces, military advisors, and mercenaries was crucial in helping al-Assad maintain control over most of Syria and preventing opponents from seizing power.

Russia viewed its involvement in Syria as evidence that, contrary to Western propaganda, it was not becoming isolated but was reasserting its role on the global stage beyond being a mere regional power. Post-2017, Russia became a pivotal actor in Syria and the wider region, compelling other states engaged in the Syrian conflict, such as Iran and Turkey, to consider Moscow's influence.

Al-Assad's downfall starkly challenges Putin's global ambitions. As Russian analyst Ruslan Pukhov noted in "Kommersant," the events in Syria demonstrate that Russia currently lacks the military strength, resources, and authority needed to effectively intervene outside the boundaries of the former Soviet Union.

Why was Putin able to save al-Assad between 2015 and 2017, yet made no attempt now? The simplest explanation can be summarised in one word: Ukraine.

Seven or eight years ago, when the Kremlin could effectively help al-Assad stabilise Syria, it was not engaged in a full-scale conflict against Ukraine. The Syrian situation reveals that, contrary to Russian propaganda, this war is a significant burden for Russia, depleting Moscow's resources to such an extent that it cannot even significantly aid a close ally like al-Assad.

Ukrainians not only defended themselves against the grim prospect of Russian conquest during the 2022 "special operation," but by mounting strong resistance to Putin, they created conditions that enabled the removal of a particularly brutal dictator from Syria.

Al-Assad had an important ally in Iran, and support from Hezbollah, a powerful non-state actor backed by Tehran. However, Hezbollah was weakened by recent conflicts with Israel, which also shifted Syria's balance of power against al-Assad.

Even if Russia wished and possessed greater capacities to assist al-Assad, it remains uncertain how effective it would have been.

Al-Assad's regime, sustained through extreme violence and repression in recent years, exhausted its social base and lost remaining support, exacerbated by economic sanctions stifling Syrian society.

Ultimately, when the decisive moment arrived, no one was willing to fight for the dictator. The rapid success of the opposition and minimal resistance from government forces took everyone by surprise, including Western observers.

Putin has always preferred cultivating relationships with authoritarian leaders over building bridges with the societies from which Russia seeks support. Al-Assad's downfall illustrates that this tactic works only until an unsupported dictatorship can no longer sustain itself solely through violence.

Today, all authoritarian rulers who have drawn closer to Putin in recent years are observing al-Assad's fall. Witnessing the Syrian leader's exile, they will question whether they truly backed the right ally, whether Putin is a reliable partner who can defend his clients when needed.

The implications of Syria's power shift extend beyond Putin's image among the "dictators' club" or Moscow’s unfulfilled superpower aspirations.

The critical issue for the Kremlin is whether the new Syrian leadership will allow Russia to retain its two military bases: Tartus naval base and Khmeimim airbase. In 2017, al-Assad leased these bases to Russia for 49 years in appreciation for military support that helped him retain power. It's unclear if the new authorities will honour these agreements. British expert Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House suggests that the bases will likely remain under Russian control for now, though she notes that Russia can't view these assets as entirely secure.

Both bases are crucial for Russia's influence in the Middle East and Africa. Tartus is Russia's sole naval base outside the former Soviet Union, playing a vital role for its Mediterranean and Indo-Pacific naval forces.

Post-Ukraine, Africa was the next area for Putin's global reach. Russia sought connections with dictators in countries like the Central African Republic, deploying mercenaries from the Wagner Group known for their extraordinary brutality, who received access to lucrative resources "in gratitude." The airbase in Khmeimim served as a key hub for these operations. Its potential closure would complicate Russia's recent presence in Africa from a logistical perspective.

Simultaneously, Putin's defeat in Syria does not necessarily offer positive news for Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Tatiana Stanovaya, a Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre expert, suggests the Syrian events might harden Putin’s approach to Ukraine. In Putin's view, losing face in Syria necessitates that he avoid any perceptions of weakness regarding Ukraine.

Even before al-Assad's downfall, analysts of Russia warned that Putin might spurn initial negotiation offers, convinced that prolonging the war would reinforce his future bargaining position. The question is how the Trump administration will respond in light of Putin's perceived weakness in Syria.

Sadly, the changes in Syria do not necessarily bring us closer to peace in Eastern Europe. Europe watches Syrian developments with apprehension due to another reason. If the new government fails to quickly establish stable and peaceful governance that engages Syrian society's diversity, we could witness further civil conflict, heightened chaos, new humanitarian crises, and perhaps another refugee surge.

Politically unstable European nations might struggle to handle such a situation, fuelling a rise in populism—a trend that could indirectly or directly align with Moscow's interests.