Syrian conflict deepens: Power struggles follow Assad's fall

The rebels are not a unified group, and it is uncertain whether the various factions of the rebellion, previously united by their opposition to Assad, will be able to cooperate now that their common enemy has gone. External players also continue to interfere in Syria's internal affairs.

Israeli forces have entered southern Syria and started to establish a special security zone there. Meanwhile, the Turkish army is preparing for a major military operation aimed at the complete elimination of the Kurdish quasi-state in northern Syria.

The civil war in Syria is one of the most complex conflicts of modern times. This is not only because it has persisted for over 13 years but also because of the vast number of players involved. Bashar al-Assad clung to power thanks to a broad Russian-Iranian coalition, further supported by Shiite militias from Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Removing Assad from the equation does not simplify the Syrian conflict. The rebels, who defeated Assad's army near Aleppo and took over Damascus a week later, are not a monolith. They are a broad coalition of groups with diverse interests and visions for post-war Syria.

The Syrian rebel camp is divided into two main factions: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, or the Levant Liberation Organization) and the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army.

HTS is led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who was previously the head of Al Qaeda's Syrian branch before distancing himself in 2016 and creating his own group, adopting more moderate political positions. HTS was the leading force behind the recent offensive that led to Assad's downfall. HTS fighters ultimately took Damascus, thereby granting Julani enormous influence over the direction "new Syria" would take.

Julani has distanced himself from the image of a jihadist and is trying to portray himself as the "father of the nation." He issues manifestos directed at Syria's numerous minorities (Druze, Alawites, Christians, Kurds, etc.), assuring them that their rights will be respected and that they will find a place in the "new Syria."

These actions are yielding expected results: Western European countries are increasingly discussing the need to recognise the new Syrian authority, and the USA has withdrawn the $10 million reward previously offered for information on Julani (a reward resulting from his being listed as a wanted terrorist by America).

Friendly gestures towards Syrian minorities and the West are only a part of what Julani is doing in Damascus. He is attempting to concentrate as much power as possible into his hands. This is particularly evident in the transitional government he established in the capital after Assad's fall. It consists solely of members of the so-called Government of National Salvation - a political puppet of Julani's, created in 2017 to govern the Idlib province.

Importantly, no member of the pro-Turkish Syrian Interim Government, another puppet body operating in northern Syria and supported by Turkey, has been included. Thus, we currently have a situation where two competing governments are in the rebel-held territories.

Though Julani has allocated three governor positions to members of the pro-Turkish faction (Aleppo, Latakia, and Damascus - excluding the capital), the ambitions of this faction are much greater.

Julani's attempt to consolidate full control over Syria may - in the long term - lead him into conflict with the pro-Turkish faction and Turkey itself.

For now, however, Turkey's attention is diverted from the events in Damascus by the situation in northern Syria. The Turks aim to use the chaos following Assad's fall to finally resolve the Syrian Kurds issue.

Pro-Turkish rebel forces have already taken control of the city of Manbij (before Assad's fall, the city was under Russian protection) and have pushed the Kurds to the other side of the Euphrates. The Turkish army is now intensely preparing for a broad offensive that will deliver the final blow to the Kurds.

However, Joe Biden and nearly 1,800 American soldiers, who are still present in northern Syria in Kurdish-held areas, are blocking President Erdogan's plans. The Biden administration is attempting to block the Turkish operation and reach a compromise between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. But time is running out. On 20th January 2025, Donald Trump will return to the White House, and he has always criticised U.S. involvement in Syria, having once tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the country in 2019.

While the Turks are concluding preparations for an offensive against the Kurds in northern Syria, in the south of the country, Israel is conducting its own operation, codenamed "Operation Beshan Arrow." The Israeli air force is destroying heavy equipment left by Assad's army, and the Israeli army has crossed the border and started occupying villages and towns adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights. The Israeli Defence Ministry announced that one of the goals of this operation is to establish a special security zone in southern Syria.

However, it's unclear which exact area the Israeli army will occupy. It is also not clear how long they intend to remain in Syria. Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared it is only a temporary occupation, but Israeli media speculate that he may want to annex this land to Israel for a longer period.

Assad is out of the "game for Syria," but the game itself continues. Julani has definitely gained the most from Assad's fall. His forces took Damascus, and he was tasked with forming a new government. His past service with Al Qaeda is forgotten; now, Western government delegations come to him, and he is seen by the West as the most important representative of Syrian change. However, Julani does not have complete control over the rebellion, part of which is under Turkish control. The future of the Syrian rebellion will depend on how his relations with Turkey develop. Will all groups unite under one banner, or will the division between Julani's people and Turkey's persist?

For now, Julani is attempting to maintain good relations with Turkey, but there are several potential flashpoints. Julani wants to concentrate all power over the country in his hands. While he is willing to share positions with the pro-Turkish faction, only to the extent that it does not threaten his monopoly on power. Additionally, Julani - unlike the pro-Turkish option - declares a desire to cooperate with the Kurds.

The unresolved Kurdish issue ensures that the war in Syria will continue. Turkey's primary policy goal in Syria is not to remove Assad from power but to eliminate the Kurdish quasi-state. Turkey is certain to want to exploit the chaos in Syria and the change in U.S. administration to realise its ambitions in Syria.

Rich Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, could also stir the pot in Syrian politics. At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, these countries supported Syrian rebel groups, but then they normalised relations with Assad. Saudi Arabia and the UAE criticise Turkey's involvement in Syria, while also approaching Julani with great suspicion. Using their influence in the forming Trump administration, the Saudis and Emirates may attempt to block the Turkish operation against the Kurds and lift sanctions imposed on Syria.

The current situation in Syria could also have consequences for the West. The Syrian chaos might be exploited by ISIS, which, although it lost its last city in Syria in 2019, was never completely dismantled and continues to operate actively in the backcountry of the Syrian Desert.

All of this guarantees that the Syrian situation will remain volatile. Assad's fall is not the end of the war in Syria but rather the beginning of its new chapter.

Tomasz Rydelek, Middle East expert