Russia's military struggles with officer shortages and losses

The Russian mechanised infantry tactics manual assumes that junior officers directly lead their subunits in battle. This results in significant losses under the accepted tactic of wave infantry attacks. The Russians identified the problem in 2022 and, by the following summer, prepared the first reform to address the gap.

However, the bloody statistics won't change. To date, the deaths of over 4,300 officers from the Russian army, Rosgwardia, and other security forces have been confirmed. 467 of them held the rank of lieutenant colonel or higher, including eight generals. In the last six months alone, 56 senior officers have died, including one general.

Significant losses in the officer corps are almost embedded in the DNA of the Russian army—during World War II, a platoon commander of the Red Army survived on average for a week. Over four years, about 600,000 platoon and company commanders died.

Yurii Fedorov, a member of the Czech Association of International Studies, a former research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, and a military expert and security specialist, estimates that Russians are currently missing 15,000-20,000 lower-ranking officers.

This is one of the reasons for the increasing Russian casualties among soldiers fighting on the front line. From the beginning of the war, they were poorly commanded; however, as the experienced command cadre began to dwindle, old reservists with a Soviet mentality or inexperienced officers just out of school have been sending soldiers into battle. There were even instances where students in their final years of officer studies were sent to the front to complete a combat internship as platoon deputy commanders before graduating. But young cadets are not only inadequately trained, they lack any experience even at non-commissioned officer positions.

In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence decided that civilian college graduates could undertake a year's military service. If one of them opts to become a line officer or reserve officer, they must submit a report and, after six months of service, attend special 3-month courses at military schools. In this case, the military service period is shortened by 3 months, and the army receives a new second lieutenant after 9 months of training.

This solution has helped little. In an effort to quickly improve the personnel situation, the State Duma, at the beginning of the year, raised the age limit for reserve soldiers and non-commissioned officers from 35–50 to 40–55 years. The bill also provided the possibility of signing a contract for service in the active reserve from 50 up to 70 years for senior officers.

In the occupied areas of Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea, the Russians have established a military administration to replace the civilian one during wartime. Initially, positions were filled by collaborators and officials sent from other regions of the Russian Federation. Over time, they had to return to their home offices. The Kremlin decided that their places would be taken by veterans of the so-called special military operation.

To achieve this, the Ministry of Defence created the "Time of Heroes" programme, aimed at selecting a sufficient number of veterans who should have at least a secondary school education and a willingness to work. Putin explained that the involvement of veterans in the administration of occupied territories is only the beginning.

He emphasised that veterans should occupy leading government positions in many areas of the country, calling them the "new elite" of Russia. The programme caused controversy because some participants were accused of war crimes by Ukrainians. These individuals were to be promoters of the image of heroes.

Even the low requirements set for the "new elite" became an obstacle. Mere patriotism and veteran status proved insufficient because most candidates did not possess even the minimal skills needed to begin training.

Most veterans have been mobilised in the past two years and are primarily from the poorest regions of the Federation. Only a small group of senior officers have completed training without issues and are now used by propaganda in promotional materials. For example, Col. Artem Zhoha became the plenipotentiary of the president in the Ural Federal District. Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Ivan Amirov is interning in the office of the president's plenipotentiary in the Volga Federal District.

They are, however, the exception. As a result, the Russians have extended the programme until the end of January next year due to the insufficient number of candidates who meet the requirements. Russian media suggests that young educated officers should be encouraged, although they are still in short supply.

And so, the Russians have found themselves in another vicious circle.