Russia's cosmic challenges: Can Bakanov steer a new course?

On Thursday, 6 February, Vladimir Putin appointed a new head of Roscosmos, tasked with overseeing Russia's space endeavours. Dmitry Bakanov, the new Director-General, has replaced Yuri Borisov at the helm of the agency.

Bakanov was born in Leninsk (now Baikonur) in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1985. Twenty-two years later, he graduated from St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance. He quickly became involved with the space sector, leading organisations such as the Gonets Satellite System firm, which operates transmission and communication systems for Roscosmos. Between 2011 and 2025, he worked for the Ministry of Transport (serving as Deputy Minister from 2022). Bakanov, therefore, has some experience and competence to manage Roscosmos. However, he faces a challenging task.

Borisov was the head of the agency from 2022, having succeeded Dmitry Rogozin (who led Roscosmos from 2018 to 2022 and was previously Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Space Industry). Like his successor, Borisov was expected to usher Roscosmos into a new era. The plans were ambitious, including more rocket launches, investments in satellite constellations, and withdrawal from the International Space Station (ISS) programme in favour of building its own station. In practice, very little was accomplished.

Roscosmos directly succeeded the Soviet space programme, which did not have a single central body responsible for oversight. The Russian Space Agency (Roscosmos for short) was established by decree of President Boris Yeltsin on 25 February 1992. The agency mirrored the state in which it was established: the 1990s were a period of severe financial crisis, although Roscosmos gained slight relief through commercial flights. With the economic situation improving under Vladimir Putin, Roscosmos also appeared to regain some of its former strength, undertaking several scientific missions (e.g., Koronas Foton, Spektr R). There were controversies over the huge expenditures on the ISS, but the reorganisation during 2013-2016 and later under Rogozin's leadership brought some optimism. However, it was short-lived.

Under Rogozin's leadership, Roscosmos began to withdraw from international projects, including the Lunar Gateway programme (a spaceport for a lunar orbiter) led by NASA. It also withdrew from participation in the ESA cosmodrome programme in Kourou, French Guiana. Instead, cooperation was established with the Chinese National Space Agency on the construction of a lunar base. However, Borisov failed to resolve the issues plaguing Roscosmos.

The number of rocket launches remained very low. For instance, in 2023, Russia launched only 19 carrier rockets into space. During the same period, the USA launched 110 rockets, while China launched 66. In the first three quarters of 2024, Russian rockets achieved fewer than 10 successful launches.

This is not surprising, as the programme for the modern Angara A5 carrier rocket is experiencing significant delays due to technical problems. The successor to the Proton M, developed since 1995, made its debut in 2014, but since then, Angara A5 rockets have launched only a few times, often after multiple postponements. For example, last year's April launch was delayed by several days due to a fault in the pressure-boosting system in one of the tanks, followed by another delay the next day due to a malfunction in the engine start control system.

Of course, Americans, Chinese, and Europeans also encounter problems, but they possess entirely different resources and scientific-technical potential. Angara A5 launches have taken place from, among other locations, the new Vostochny Cosmodrome, which is practically a monument to incompetence: over 17,000 cases of legal and regulatory violations were recorded during its construction, resulting in 140 criminal cases and estimated losses of billions of roubles.

The situation with satellites was no better. Last year, Borisov announced that by 2036, Russia aims to have 2,600 satellites in orbit. Among them would be Russia's equivalent to the famous Starlink - the Sfera system. Initially, there were to be 600 satellites, then 360; funds were obtained for 162, and money was received for approximately 80, even though the need was for as many as 1,200. The goal was to produce no fewer than 250 satellites of all types per year. According to Western news agencies, in practice, Russia produces about 15 satellites of all types annually, even though theoretically, it could produce more, up to 40. There is still a long way to fully utilise production capacities, let alone think about their expansion.

The situation is no better with the Russian Orbital Station (ROSS), construction of which is set to begin in 2027, with the first manned flight expected in 2028. The station is to consist of up to seven modules by 2035, with crew presence only part-time - the station is intended to be highly automated. Even Russian analysts cautiously suggest that the programme may be too ambitious for Russia's space industry, similar to the lost Luna 25 Moon probe in 2023.

The causes of the Roscosmos crisis are both simple and complex. Simple because they generally stem from Russia's problems as a state. Without Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it would not have had constrained (sanctions are not fully airtight) access to Western technologies. Roscosmos would not have been excluded from some Western space missions (like the ExoMars rover programme conducted by ESA), and Roscosmos would have had much greater income from exports. These earnings - from services or the sale of rocket engines - fell by about 90% after the invasion.

Of course, the war in Ukraine will eventually end, and sanctions will end some time after that, but new players on the market, such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and state agencies from India and Japan, will not surrender customers to the Russians. The situation is complex because Roscosmos has internal problems, partly due to inefficient management and partly due to technological backwardness, which, according to some analysts, sanctions will deepen by 10-20 years.

Bakanov, therefore, faces a task that is at least challenging. Will he manage to save Roscosmos from further decline? It is doubtful. Bakanov has considerable administrative experience and knowledge in the space industry. However, he is not a miracle worker. The head of Roscosmos has changed, but the agency remains, even according to open Russian reports, an inefficient and corrupt institution, as well as underfunded.