Russian sabotage tactics threaten German infrastructure stability

Reports indicate that the GRU, the Russian military intelligence agency, trained a professional group of saboteurs who intended to use the influx of refugees to infiltrate German territory. The saboteurs had specific targets to attack, but they were apprehended before they managed to cross the border.

German authorities confirm that despite detecting one group, another sabotage team did successfully enter the country. Their task is to carry out attacks on civilian and military targets.

According to documents cited by German media, the Kremlin developed a detailed plan to cause a blackout in Germany. Experts emphasise that Germany has become a frontline state, despite the geographical buffer of Poland between it and Russia.

Security specialists highlight the need for significantly increased protection of critical infrastructure. In connection with this, there are calls for the reinstatement of mandatory military service as a means to bolster national security.

The German newspaper's published article presents photographs purporting to be evidence of the planned sabotage, including a notebook containing phone numbers and addresses.

A recognised expert in this field also presented an analysis of Russian sabotage. Daniela Richterová, in an article in the scientific journal tandfonline.com (Taylor & Francis Online), explained the methods used by the Kremlin.

According to the authors of the report, Russian services are becoming increasingly active. In the first quarter of 2024, there was a significant increase in attacks and disruptions featuring the hallmarks of sabotage. These actions include fires, cyberattacks, the destruction of undersea communication and defence cables, and power outages at major airports. Sabotage, as a classic form of subthreshold warfare, aims to weaken the opponent in a way that is difficult to detect and prove.

The first Kremlin-sponsored sabotage operations on NATO territory took place a decade after Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2011, Russian military intelligence (GRU) carried out an attack on an ammunition depot in Bulgaria where equipment intended for Georgia was stored. Three years later, following Moscow's annexation of Crimea, a similar fate befell a Czech warehouse containing military supplies for Ukrainian forces.

Russian intelligence services have adopted a new approach to recruiting and directing agent-saboteurs, utilising the opportunities offered by the sharing economy. Recruitment is mainly conducted online, through encrypted communication channels, with payments made using cryptocurrencies.

This model allows for a significant reduction in operational costs while simultaneously increasing their scale and pace. Contractor fees are relatively low, ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred pounds per task. This approach enables Russia to engage a wider range of contractors, including individuals unaware of the true purpose of their actions.

The expert reveals a series of sabotage actions, including arson attacks on shopping centres, furniture warehouses, paint factories, and storage facilities, as well as disruptions to railway operations in Sweden, Germany, and the Czech Republic. The document also highlights acts of sabotage such as the destruction of a warehouse in London containing humanitarian aid (March 2024), an explosion in a weapons factory in Wales producing arms for Ukraine, an explosion in an ammunition factory in Scranton (Pennsylvania) producing 155mm shells for Ukraine, and an explosion in an arms production facility in Arkansas (producing Hellfire and Javelin missiles).

Previous cases of sabotage include, among others: the blowing up of an ammunition depot in Bulgaria (2011), two explosions in an ammunition depot in the Czech Republic (2014), cyberattacks, sabotage of undersea communication and defence cables, and power outages at major airports.