Russian navy struggles: Outdated fleet and endless repairs

The missile cruisers of project 1144 are large ships. They have a displacement of 29,000 tonnes, hulls 252 metres long, and beneath the deck are two nuclear reactors providing unlimited range, as well as 20 launchers for anti-ship missiles P-700 Granit, each 10 metres long and weighing about 7,000 kilograms. In addition, there are 12 launchers for anti-aircraft missiles of the S-300F Fort system, shorter-range launchers, and strong artillery.

The Soviet Union built four such units in the 1970s and '80s—one under Project 1144 and three improved ones representing Project 11442. The construction of large ships was part of an ambitious plan to transform the Soviet Navy into an ocean fleet capable of challenging the US Navy.

Forty years ago, the specification of the project 1144 missile cruisers might have been impressive, but today, the pride of the Russian fleet is akin to a "blind boxer"—a unit with theoretically strong offensive armament but dramatically outdated sensors, helpless against modern electronic warfare, and incapable of self-defence. The fate of the cruiser "Moskva" (a unit half its size, representing project 1164), which was destroyed by Ukrainians, shows what happens when you send an outdated ship into battle.

The Russians are aware of the weaknesses of the last large ships of their fleet. That is why two of the four project 1144 units were decommissioned in the early 21st century, and the flagship of the Northern Fleet, "Peter the Great", will soon head to the repair yard. Soon, meaning with the completion of the modernisation of its sister ship, "Admiral Nakhimov". The current plan is for "Nakhimov" to return to service in 2026, and "Peter the Great" to be removed from the fleet in 2030.

The problem is that the Russian cruiser has been under repair since 1997. It is worth noting that—as with the 18-year construction of the Polish corvette ORP "Ślązak"—an extremely long repair or construction time does not mean that work has been continuously carried out over the years. They were started, interrupted, and then resumed many times—depending on current political decisions.

Despite this, the service history of the Russian cruiser looks unusual. Launched in 1986 and incorporated into the fleet in 1988, the ship went to the repair yard in 1997 and has not left it since. In the last decade alone, the Kremlin announced that the large ship would return to service in 2018, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and now claims it will happen in 2026. Ukrainians estimate—though it is difficult to verify the accuracy of these estimates—that the cost of modernisation could already amount to £4 billion.

A glimmer of hope for the actual completion of the exceptionally long repair is the information that one of the two KN-3 nuclear reactors each with a capacity of 150,000 kilowatts, powering "Admiral Nakhimov", has been started. According to Ukrainian sources, this happened as early as 20th December 2024, but Russian media reported it with a significant delay.

Although the rebuilding of Admiral Nakhimov will not transform it into a modern warship, it is supposed to significantly enhance its capabilities. This involves installing an 80-container vertical launcher of the UKSK 3C14 system. It's the Russian equivalent of the Western Mk 41 VLS launchers, allowing warships to carry varied armaments, depending on their missions, placed in hidden under-the-deck vertical launchers.

Thanks to this solution, the old ship will gain the ability to launch modern Russian missiles used to attack ships and land targets, such as Zircon, Onyx, or Kalibr. Eighty starting containers are a lot for the Russian fleet. It is noteworthy that American Ticonderoga-class cruisers, with three times smaller displacement, are armed with 122 Mk 41 VLS launchers.

The potential return of "Admiral Nakhimov" to service will surely be presented by Russian propaganda as a great success and a huge boost to the navy. Years ago, the TASS agency, announcing the return of "Nakhimov" to service, described it as the most powerful warship in the world.

This is obviously false, and the facts are quite different. The Russian navy, still aspiring to be an ocean fleet in the 1980s, is steadily eroding and losing its capabilities.

The largest Russian warship—the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov—has been undergoing problematic repairs for so long that Russian naval aviation has effectively ceased to exist, just like the trained crew of the ship, part of which was sent as infantry to the war in Ukraine.

The two nuclear missile cruisers are "Admiral Nakhimov", still undergoing endless repairs, and "Peter the Great", which continues to await repair. Two smaller conventionally powered cruisers, "Varyag" and "Marshal Ustinov", are contemporaries of "Moskva" with similar capabilities.

Russia can still organise propaganda cruises to Cuba or joint patrols with China near Japan or Alaska. Still, in terms of potential, its navy is a shadow of the maritime power the Soviet Union tried to build years ago.

Russian shipyards are still building frigates, corvettes, and submarines or new landing ships, but the number of new units is insufficient to replace older, decommissioned ships and rejuvenate the fleet generationally.

The propaganda claims about plans to build new-generation large warships, such as a nuclear aircraft carrier based on the project 1143.7 developed back in the 1980s, can be considered entirely unreliable. The peak of Russian capabilities seems to currently be the delayed completion of the large helicopter-carrying landing ships of project 23900 Priboj.

This does not mean that the threat from Russian warships should be underestimated. This is especially important in the Baltic, where—although the capabilities of Russian surface units are limited—submarines remain a significant threat.

Although the Russian-developed project 677 (Lada class) proved unsuccessful, the production of old, proven units of project 636 (now 636.3) continues. Some of them are not only armed with torpedoes but can also launch Kalibr cruise missiles from underwater, posing a threat to navigation and land targets.