UK's illusion of military might. Lack of a war plan exposed

According to reports from Sky News, the UK government does not have a defence plan for its territory or any other plan preparing the country for a full-scale war.

The authors were able to determine that the authorities of the United Kingdom do not possess any current set of documents that could be considered an integrated, comprehensive plan for conducting operations in the event of a war. Such a document is yet to be created, and the first work on it will begin in the second half of April. A war game is supposed to kick-start it, in which representatives from the armed forces, the Prime Minister's office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Home Office will participate. These discussions are intended to explore the potential response of individual departments and the government to war.

It's already known that the potential involvement of the United Kingdom in a full-scale war would necessitate the mobilisation of industry and society (hence, for example, the need to examine World War II methods of solving similar problems), and an increase in defence spending, including investment in the arms industry. So far, there is no information about plans for similar moves. However, they could encounter political and financial difficulties.

One possible remedy could be the restoration of the Government War Books, a set of instructions and principles for organising the state in times of war abandoned about 20 years ago because they were supposedly unnecessary.

The lack of planning documents is not entirely true. For example, in 2021, the government released the document "Defence in a Competitive Age," in March this year, the "Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper" was published. Both, however, concern the army, not the comprehensive security of the state. General planning problems are compounded by chaotic and not always rational modernisation.

In the last three decades, which coincided with much of the "end of history" era, authorities have developed a great talent for effectively wasting money in one way or another. Several particularly notable examples can be highlighted.

One of them was the maritime patrol aeroplane BAE Systems Nimrod MRA4. It was essentially a modernisation of the older Hawker Siddeley Nimrod MR2 but equipped with new Rolls-Royce BR710 engines. Eventually, they were produced as new, with a new wing (23 percent larger lifting area), new avionics systems, mission systems, improved fuselage, etc. Due to delays and cost increases, the program was cancelled in 2010 after spending £3.8 billion. The new planes were scrapped with great care, even though less than a year and a half after the decision to close the program, it was realised that the decision was a mistake.

Another colourful example is the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. These powerful ships (284 metres long, 65,000 tonnes displacement) can carry only helicopters and vertical or short takeoff and landing (STOVL) aircraft, such as the super modern but offering limited capabilities F-35B. In 2002, this aircraft version was chosen, not the more capable, more traditional F-35C, because of the decision to opt for a ski-jump launch system.

Indeed, around 2010, there was an attempt to return to the concept of a traditional aircraft carrier, akin to a smaller cousin to the American Nimitzes, but it was deemed too costly. As a result, the Royal Navy now operates large and expensive ships, though with limited capabilities. Additionally, they do not carry early warning aircraft like the E-2D Hawkeye, only helicopters.

On land, the situation isn't much better. Particularly noteworthy is the story of the contemporary reconnaissance vehicle Ajax. It was intended to replace the ageing CVR(T) family of tracked vehicles. Due to numerous technical issues (e.g., vibrations endangering the health of soldiers), reluctance of the manufacturer (GDELS firm) to solve them, and procedural issues, the program is now delayed by at least six years. The total delay will reach seven years, if all flaws are addressed by the second half of next year. Likely, this, too, will not happen without additional costs.

Another tracked vehicle, the infantry fighting vehicle FV510 Warrior, is currently undergoing a modest modernisation, though it is soon to be replaced by the German-wheeled combat vehicle Boxer. The Boxer in the UK is material for a series of articles. Suffice it to say that the UK was one of the program's founders, then left it, only to return years later on worse terms. To top it off, the vehicles are purposely under-armed compared to, for example, the Polish Rosomak.

The situation with tanks is no better. Challenger 2 raised controversy over its armament even at its creation (over a quarter-century ago), including a rifled barrel gun, the last of its kind in NATO. After years, London decided to modernise the tanks, including replacing the turret and the gun—the latter will be the same as on the latest Leopard 2s.

Challenger 3 (this name will be adopted after the modernisation) will be a very modern tank. What good is that, though, if out of the 400 tanks produced, only 148 will be modernised and remain in service? Meanwhile, Rory Breen, director of strategy and future business operations at Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL), asserts that "the Challenger 3 program will deliver the best tank in NATO."

Additionally, the UK has significantly relinquished control over its armoured industry to the Rheinmetall company (responsible, among other things, for the modernisation of Challenger 2s and production of Boxers), which further raises questions about the British Army's potential.

The sum of institutional, financial, or human problems suggests that the defence of a nuclear power with global aspirations is in crisis. Perhaps the mentioned staff games will partially help overcome it because long-term, effective solutions will require a huge effort and money.