Ukraine's surprising Kursk strike reveals Russian vulnerabilities

The Ukrainian counteroffensive has been ongoing for many days. Can we call it a success?

Steven Horrell, former US Navy intelligence officer, currently an analyst at the American think tank Center for European Policy Analysis: Overall, I consider it a success at both the strategic and operational levels. However, I would focus a bit on the latter. However, there are still many unknowns.

I refer to the operational level because it must also be considered in the context of last year and the counteroffensive conducted then.

There is a huge difference between 2023 and 2024. Last year, it was strength against strength. You might win, you might not. However, you have a chance if you have a confrontation between strength and weakness. This is the case here. In 2023, Ukraine primarily lacked air supremacy.

So, did the Russians make a mistake?

Russia thought its border was secure. This section was not as threatened as others. Therefore, at this level, Moscow made its first mistake. The Russians thought they were safe. That was the case when the fighting was occurring in Ukraine. However, I would say this is more of a Ukrainian success than a Russian mistake. It was a solid and unexpected move. They attacked by surprise.

What we have been observing since 6 August is very different from what we saw before. We have to think of the operation, the front line as a whole. Another significant success for the Ukrainians was simply the operational security of these actions. Brigade and battalion commanders began to find out about it a day before the soldiers were to be ready for the assault. And then, of course, we didn't hear about it in the Western press. So, for me, it is a great strategic failure for the Russians.

Such a move wasn't possible before, though?

That's true; it also results from the change in the West. Ukraine attacked Russia, and Russia did not escalate as we feared.

In the USA, there is a strong concern about Russia's reaction - hence the caution. We feared that if we delivered weapon X, it would be a red line for Russia. However, that never happened. Poland, for example, was always ahead of us in approaching this issue.

Russia is capable of rocket and drone strikes on city centres, residential areas, and critical infrastructure. The only escalation left is a foolish attack on NATO.

Has the Western narrative already changed? The West finally started to see that an attack is also a defence?

Exactly. This aligns with every military law. These are targets and justified self-defence actions. We were afraid to say, "Let's help Ukraine win." What is an escalation at this point? The Russians attack cities, destroy critical infrastructure and residential areas, and kill civilians. You should do everything you can to stop them. These attacks often originate from military bases within Russia.

These bases are targets, and attacking them is a justified self-defence action. Therefore, it's better to say instead of "Ukrainian attack destroyed something," that "Ukraine successfully defended itself."

This should open the eyes of Western officials to the possibility of a Ukrainian victory on Ukrainian terms, and we should support that.

However, this isn't the only objective of the operation, right?

Volodymyr Zelenskyy and all his ministers have clearly stated that it's about reclaiming all the occupied territory of Ukraine. It's about returning to the sovereign and internationally recognised borders of 1991. Putin wants to talk about the sanctity of international borders? Let's talk about that.

So, this is the main objective?

I think so.

Let's put it differently. Is the strike on the Kursk region a key point of this plan?

Let's go back to 2022. Do you remember the circumstances under which Ukraine succeeded in the Kharkiv region? Operationally, they started in Kherson. The forces moved in the south, and then there was a big push in the north to reclaim most of the Kharkiv region. The objective was achieved.

So what is happening now? By attacking Kursk, Russia starts reinforcing in this region.

So, it's not ruled out that this is bait?

A two-phase attack on the operational level. If you look at the whole, you know—one hit, then another.

We don't yet know where and what reinforcements the Russians are pulling. However, there is potential to allow these two hits. In this case, the second hit was the recovery of occupied territories. However, I don't want to be too enthusiastic about this issue.

These are objectives on the operational level that provide tactical and operational advantage.

And the strategic ones?

This could include the gas pump station in Sudzha (a key Gazprom facility through which gas is transported to Europe. The facility was damaged. However, the damage did not affect transmission capabilities - ed.). What does Russia have apart from soldiers on the front line? Energy. This is a kind of bridge between the operational and strategic objectives in this respect.

Besides, you need to look at maps. Where are the highways and railway junctions? Logistics. This is crucial. We don't know if Ukraine plans to hold the territory. This is a challenging task. However, occupying these areas provides opportunities that should be seized. It gives reach. Which air bases can we now attack that we couldn't a week ago – it’s worth considering.

I wouldn't be too surprised if these events were already considered in the overall plan and the decision for an orderly, safe withdrawal.

I think what we have seen so far in Ukrainian planning shows they have mastered this aspect of operational art well. They are very aware of the fight they are in.

And the Russians? They still seem surprised

The operation exposed another strategic Russian weakness, the idea of how to coordinate actions. However, reinforcements will start to arrive, which will affect the balance of power.

Putin designated the FSB to coordinate actions. Does this show a lack of trust in the Ministry of Defence?

Putin is a former KGB officer. The FSB has always been closer to his heart than the Ministry of Defence, the army, and the armed forces. This is one aspect. The mere introduction of this change indicates the level of his concern. However, there are also some pragmatic reasons. Like most Western countries, the Kremlin has limitations on the armed forces in internal situations. Hence, the FSB will be better prepared to coordinate actions with various entities that will come into play.

So, some of them are pragmatic, but much of it emphasises the importance of the FSB for Putin over the Ministry of Defence and the army. Then, there is simply the level of concern with the events. So, he is very clearly shaken by it.

Do you then anticipate any significant upheaval at the top of Russian power?

I think we are still far from Putin's end. A palace coup or some grassroots uprisings—such a future is very difficult to foresee, though.

Do we see people in Moscow and St. Petersburg now worried and feeling unprotected? I don't think so.

However, we are witnessing a Ukrainian success. Ukraine has achieved something that will be recorded in history books – even if they retreat soon. Kyiv can now tell the Kremlin: you know where we are headed. You saw the left hook, so don't forget about the right hand. We're coming for you.