Trump's envoy Kellogg: A controversial choice for Ukraine peace

The nomination of Keith Kellogg is one of the key personnel decisions for our region. This is because the special envoy for the war in Ukraine will be responsible for fulfilling one of Trump's key campaign promises: ending the war between Russia and Ukraine and working out an agreement acceptable to all parties.

Many of Trump's personnel decisions announced so far may raise serious doubts. The President-elect proposed – often for the most important positions in the state, such as Secretary of Defence – candidates lacking any significant political experience.

His nominees often lack even basic competencies in the areas they will be dealing with. It seems that the key criterion for selection to "Trump's second team" has become not experience, but above all blind allegiance to the President-elect.

Kellogg is undoubtedly a loyal supporter of Trump. As the President-elect reminded on Wednesday, he has been with him from the very beginning, since 2016. Kellogg advised Trump as a security expert in his first election campaign and held numerous positions in Trump's first administration. After the Republican's loss in the 2020 election, he consistently defended his former employer.

Unlike many other nominees, Kellogg cannot be denied knowledge and experience. He is a retired general, a veteran of the Vietnam War and the First Gulf War. After the second Iraq War, Kellogg held top positions in the U.S.- and allied-established administration of Iraq.

Against the backdrop of Trump's various eccentric personnel choices, the general is quite an "establishment" figure, certainly fitting well within the mainstream of American foreign and security policy discourse.

What are Keith Kellogg's views on the war in Ukraine? In the early period after Putin's invasion of Ukraine, he criticised President Joe Biden for not helping Ukraine enough, refusing – out of fear of escalation – to provide weapons that could strategically tip the balance in Kyiv's favour.

Over time, like many Trump-supporting Republicans, the general concluded that Ukraine has reached a point where it is no longer capable of winning the war and certainly not regaining control over all territories legally belonging to it and occupied by Russia. Conclusion: sending further military aid to Ukraine is therefore no longer sensible, and the U.S. must use its global position to negotiate some sort of long-term settlement between Kyiv and Moscow.

In April of this year, Kellogg, along with former CIA analyst and the first Trump administration's National Security Council head, Fred Fleitz, published a report presenting a proposal to end the war.

However, most of it is not plans for the future but a critique of Joe Biden's Ukrainian policy.

The authors repeat Trump's message: Putin attacked Ukraine because there was a weak leader in the White House, who on one hand showed weakness to Putin, and on the other refused to engage with the Russian leader in constructive negotiations, instead demonising him on the international stage. Had Trump remained president in 2020 – the document further claims – the war would not have happened.

Some of the criticisms of Biden's policy in the document are not unfounded: for example, the matter of insufficient armament of Ukraine by the U.S. at the end of 2021, when the invasion was becoming an increasingly likely scenario. The arguments that Ukraine should have had access to all American military aid in the early period of the war, allowing Kyiv to resolve the conflict in its favour quickly, also sound convincing. At the same time, the report repeats several Kremlin theses. For instance, the claim that the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO "provoked" Putin to attack.

It is only in the last dozen paragraphs that Kellogg and Fleitz outline their proposal for "what next". The United States – in the view of the report authors – should condition further military assistance to Ukraine on Kyiv's readiness to negotiate with Moscow. Until negotiations are concluded, America should continue to arm Ukraine to maintain current positions – but no more than that. The negotiations would end with a ceasefire and a division of control over Ukraine along the current front lines. Russia would thus retain control of Crimea and a large part of eastern Ukraine.

Under the document's authors' proposal, Ukraine would not have to formally recognise Russia's takeover of these areas – but it would be committed to seeking to regain them through diplomatic means only. The authors anticipate an "opening" for this as a result of a "diplomatic breakthrough" in Russia.

This is a euphemism for the end of the Putin era and the system of power he built. The new, post-Putin Russian ruler would be encouraged to negotiate the return of Ukrainian lands by the prospect of fully normalising relations with the West and lifting sanctions.

Ukraine's NATO membership would be delayed to a 'holy never'. In exchange, it would receive security guarantees – the authors do not specify from whom or what – and arms to defend the new borders. If, on the other hand, Russia does not want to come to the negotiating table, the U.S. should provide Ukraine with even more armament than Biden, so that Putin has no choice.

As Kellogg told Reuters in June: "We tell the Ukrainians, ‘You’ve got to come to the table, and if you don’t come to the table, support from the United States will dry up.' And you tell Putin, ‘He’s got to come to the table and if you don’t come to the table, then we’ll give Ukrainians everything they need to kill you in the field’."

From the perspective of Ukraine and our region, Kellogg is certainly not the worst possible choice. The media previously reported that Trump was considering Richard Grenell for this position – in the President-elect's first administration, he served as the Acting Director of National Intelligence.

Grenell is known for much more scepticism regarding aid to Ukraine than Kellogg and would likely have tried to convince the Republican president that in order to end the war in Ukraine, it was worth accepting an agreement on conditions less favourable to Ukraine than those offered to Kyiv in the Fleitz-Kellogg plan.

As Ukrainian expert Volodymyr Fesenko commented on Trump's decision in an interview with "Kyiv Independent": "There will be no (outright) pro-Ukrainian appointments (under Trump). But it's good if an appointee is not anti-Ukrainian. From this standpoint, if you compare (Kellogg) with others, he's absolutely acceptable for Ukraine. His position is understandable (for Kyiv), and we can adapt to it."

At the same time, Kellogg's plans now face practical verification. And it may not be easy. Firstly, the April document – like the narrative of Trump and his circle – seems to assume that Putin wants an agreement and it has not occurred only because of Biden's stubbornness in refusing talks with the Russian leader. Meanwhile, it is not at all clear whether Putin will even want to sit at the table.

As Fredrik Wesslau, an expert from the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, recently wrote in "Foreign Policy," Putin believes that Russia is winning the war, and among the Russian elite, there is the conviction that the 2014 Minsk agreements were a mistake – because they allowed Ukraine to arm itself and modernise its army – a mistake that should not be repeated.

Russia may, therefore, consider that it is worth continuing the war now. Because even if it doesn't achieve its maximum plan – the practical liquidation of independent Ukrainian statehood – it will secure a much stronger negotiating position for itself in future talks than it currently has.

In this situation, the U.S. would increase pressure on Russia by continuing to supply Ukraine with armaments. Signals from Trump's circle also indicated that the U.S., together with Saudi Arabia, could flood markets with oil, which would hit Russia's economic interests.

The problem is that before these measures against Russia start to work, a lot of time may pass. Trump, on the other hand, promised a quick end to the war. And it is the president, not his emissary, who will make ultimate decisions regarding Russia and Ukraine.

Trump and Kellogg have a good history of cooperation, but the retired general may just as well find out that his boss has a different idea for an agreement with Putin than he does. In his first term, Trump revealed himself as a president who is bored and fatigued by complicated diplomatic issues, preferring quick, media-friendly successes to longer-term, more beneficial solutions.

Finally, whatever Russia agrees to, Putin cannot simply be trusted. The Kremlin may treat the ceasefire merely as a tactical break for rearmament and, after several years, attack Ukraine again. Unfortunately, Kellogg's plan, leaving Ukraine outside of NATO and lacking firm security guarantees, may encourage Moscow to do just that.

Whatever happens with the retired general's mission, we will likely soon find out that the international reality is much more complicated than Trump's promises of a quick and just end to the war.