Russia's Project 677 Lada: A flawed prototype leads to preference for USSR-era vessels
Unofficial sources reveal that the decision to scrap Saint Petersburg came after just two years of service - this is reported by the TASS agency, rumored to be a Kremlin propaganda outlet. The TASS statement seems to be the height of months of speculation about the vessel's future, which carries a prestigious significance for Moscow.
Expected to serve as a prototype, B-858 Saint Petersburg was intended to precede the build of a 20-vessel series of a new type (Project 677)–designed and built entirely in Russia post-USSR. However, the plans didn't go as Russian officials expected.
Unsuccessful prototype
The Central Design Bureau of Marine Engineering Rubin in Petersburg developed 1989-1996 the concept of new, non-nuclear units for operation in enclosed waters–primarily the Baltic and Black Seas.
The new unit was purported to be the successor to older diesel-electric powered vessels - Project 613 and 633 units, and eventually Project 636 units (for the Russian navy) and 877 Paltus (export variant), known under Warszawianka (From Polish capitol- Warsaw)
In conjunction with Project 677 Lada, the Rubin design office developed its export variant, 677 Amur. In 1997, construction commenced on the prototype vessel, Saint Petersburg. The unit reached completion in 2004; its flag was formally raised on it in 2010.
But these were superficial achievements - while the vessel entered service, it didn’t attain operational readiness – it was staffed by experimental crews during which many technical problems were exposed.
These flaws were addressed ad hoc - a major reconstruction was ruled out due to costs. However, in 2020, seventeen years post-launch, the vessel was officially commissioned into service.
Project 677 Lada submarines
Russia's issue rests in the fact that they initiated the construction of serial units before fully testing the prototype Saint Petersburg. Significant changes were made in the subsequent pieces compared to the prototype. However, according to Tomasz Grotnik of the Military Research and Analysis Team, it was determined in 2012 that Project 677 Lada is flawed, underperforms, and construction should stop.
Admiral Wysocki, the author of the damning evaluation, was rapidly dismissed. His successor, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, wasn't as critical of the Project 677 vessels. That being the case, in 2013, another political decision extended the stalled project, and the construction resumed while simultaneously advertising non-existing vessels as specialized submarine hunters.
The ship’s design has significantly improved (and got simplified in contrast to the ambitious assumptions made twenty-five years ago: the air-independent propulsion system, for instance, was removed). Numerous changes were introduced in the subsequent units. Concurrently, it was decided to build twelve Lada-type vessels instead of the initial twenty.
Although the Russians have formally expressed their plans to complete and order additional Ladas, the tests delayed by years (the inaugural serial vessel, Kronstadt, was tested in 2018) suggest that not all problems are fixed. As a result, despite the navy's resistance, the testing of Project 677 vessels was shortened due to intervention by Minister Sergei Shoigu.
On January 31, 2024, Moscow announced a success: as described by Karolina Modzelewska, the Admiralty Shipyards in Saint Petersburg formally commissioned the first serial vessel of Project 677 Lada, i.e. B-586 Kronstadt into service.
Another vessel - B-587 Velikye Luki is awaiting final tests completion. The Russian Ministry of Defense has ordered additional units, the Vologda and Yaroslav vessels, and one more with an undisclosed name.
Old is better than new
In the article "Russian military novelties are projects from the USSR era," I pointed out that the Kremlin's great power rhetoric extols the merits of "new" military equipment models, which are essentially mere modifications of projects developed during the USSR era.
This happens because currently, baring a few exceptions, the Russian defence sector is suffering a catastrophic staff shortage. Engineers educated during the USSR era are not only retiring, but also dying on the job due to old age before they can train successors.
Over the last ten years, the creators of key weapon systems used by Russia have died - Pavel Simonov (Su-27), Mikhail Kalashnikov (AK system weapon), Rollan Martirossov (Su-34), Pavel Kamnev (Kalibr missiles), and Sergei Nepochodimy (Iskander missiles).
Russia is losing not merely staff, but also invaluable institutional memory. Given the demographic decline and projected economic problems, its reconstruction may prove impossible.
As a result, the Russians have resorted to old projects once more despite the Kremlin putting on a brave face and extolling Lada-type vessels to compensate for their construction failure. A modernized Project 636.3 was created based on the export version of old Paltusies. Thanks to this, Russia has been rapidly building conventional submarines since 2009.
While the project has undoubtedly been improved, and the vessels now have new abilities (including the launching of Kalibr missiles), the current state of Russian shipbuilding is epitomized by the fact that - after a not-very successful attempt at building a new generation vessel - Russia is constructing and commissioning more Warszawiankas into service. For the Russian submarine fleet, the so-called "new" vessels, whose design dates back to the 1970s, are the unexpected savior.
