Russia's new drone tactics outmanoeuvre Ukrainian defenses
The Russians have perfected the use of new drones, which present a significant challenge for the Ukrainians. Jammers are ineffective against them, and the passive armour of vehicles such as the M2A2 Bradley from the USA and the Marder 1A3 from Germany is inadequate. We uncover the mystery behind them.
In Ukraine, both sides utilise, for example, FPV drones as a substitute for modern anti-tank guided missiles. Such a drone has a significant advantage because its low speed and control maintained until the very end enables the pilot to strike a specific point on the armour with great precision. Below, you can view recordings of Russian FPV drone attacks with fibre optic cables on Ukrainian M2A2 Bradley and Marder 1A3.
Drones with fibre optics — the sole defence is to shoot them down
FPV drones with items like PG-7VL grenades have become a nightmare for Russian armoured equipment, prompting their own gradual adoption. Ukrainians managed to destroy even reinforced T-90M tanks with their help, while the Russians could disable Leopard 2s.
Over time, however, both sides began extensively using jammers to interfere with the control signal, creating an interference bubble around vehicles that ranged from several dozen to hundreds of metres, preventing attacks. Since then, drone operators have alternated periods of powerlessness with periods of regained dominance if they could adjust the control frequency outside the jamming range.
However, this was merely a workaround, making it necessary to design drones capable of operating under such conditions. There are two paths to achieving this: drones supported by artificial intelligence algorithms that allow autonomous flight for the last few hundred metres and drones with deployable fibre optics.
The second method is straightforward and economical because it has been used for decades in anti-tank-guided missiles. The deployable fibre optic cable ensures seamless control and video signal transmission under any conditions until impact. For example, an advantage for the Russians is the ability to target a specific spot on a vehicle, bypassing sections of the M2A2 Bradley fitted with BRAT reactive armour bricks.
Furthermore, the drone is entirely passive and emits no radio signals, making it undetectable to passive detectors. Thus, the only way to stop such a drone is to detect it with radar or an electro-optical system and shoot it down. Presently, very few vehicles can defend themselves independently against them, and this remains a prospect for tank and future vehicle projects displayed at events like Eurosatory or MSPO.
Currently, the best chance lies with tanks and vehicles equipped with an active defence system similar to Israel's Rafael Trophy or fitted with an independent anti-drone module, such as the "beast from Tarnów".
Of course, "cable drones" have their limitations as the necessity of carrying a spool with deployable fibre optic cable restricts their effective range to around 10 kilometres, depending on the components used and the drone's weight limit. Both Ukrainians and Russians are employing fibre optic drones, and they are gaining popularity due to their simplicity and ease of production.
