Russia's ambitious military expansion: New armies and financial strains

Russians have observed that not all is proceeding as envisioned, prompting changes based on wartime insights. The initial reform commenced in the autumn of 2022, aiming to bolster army personnel and institute regular reserve training.

The authorities resolved to mobilise an additional 500,000 conscripts and to extend the upper age limit for military conscription by 3 years, from 27 to 30. This adjustment notably improved the personnel situation within the armed forces.

Nevertheless, climbing losses revealed that the army's size remained inadequate. Russians prepared for yet another reform, this time planning to increase the army's ranks to ultimately include 1.5 million soldiers. Moreover, the minimum conscription age is set to rise from 18 to 21 years old.

The Kremlin accurately deduced that the current army size does not assure the security of the vast nation. Deploying half a million soldiers in Ukraine left slightly over 600,000 for homeland defence. Specifically depleted were the garrisons in the Caucasus and the Far East, regions where border skirmishes with China regularly occur. The Russians see no alternative but to augment their army size.

Shoigu's declarations signal the next stage in the considerable expansion of the Armed Forces. Regrettably, Shoigu did not disclose how the ministry intends to finance the formation of additional brigades and their equipment. The personal kit for a soldier alone costs roughly £22,000, just the tip of the iceberg. Equipping units with vehicles presents an even bigger challenge.

In the forthcoming May parades, the mechanised component was absent. Even in Red Square, no tanks were displayed. However, vehicles adorned with the Georgian ribbon, a feature of parade vehicles, were spotted at the front.

To date, the Russians have lost about 30% of their total tank reserves since the war began, along with about 50% of first-line vehicles. Despite increased production, it barely compensates for frontline losses.

Ministry documents reveal that within a year, "The Ground Forces received a total of 1,530 new and modernised tanks," and over 2,200 infantry fighting vehicles and wheeled transporters. Over two years of conflict, the Russians lost between 4,500 and 8,000 vehicles of this type. Additionally, the industry supplied more than 12,000 other vehicles – including trucks, engineering equipment, and SUVs, of which 1,400 units are armoured vehicles, like the Tigr.

Vehicles classified as "modernised" include those retrieved from deep reserves and repaired after being damaged at the front. Despite repairs, these vehicles are in a poor technical state and, even post-modernisation, leave the factories with limited combat capabilities. Notably, they lack sophisticated electronic equipment and fire control systems that Russians previously imported from Germany and France, now sourcing from Belarus.

Production levels are lacking, although, as reported by the TASS news agency, the defence conglomerate Rostec raised tank production sevenfold last year, and the output of infantry fighting vehicles and wheeled transporters by 4.5 times. These figures are expected to further increase as the industry nears completion of its shift to a war footing.

Additional billions of rubles are being allocated to both industry and military endeavours. In 2023, defence spending saw a 36% increase from the previous year. Russia dedicated over 6% of its GDP to defence, accounting for more than 32% of state budget expenditures. Such financial commitment has not been seen since the arms race of the 1970s.

Next year, the Kremlin plans to spend roughly £96 billion on army modernisation, construction of new defence factories, and weapon production. By comparison, Poland allocated roughly £22 billion to its entire Ministry of National Defence budget this year. However, these funds will not completely satisfy the army's needs. Shoigu announced that defence funding based on orders in 2023 will rise almost one and a half times, addressing 97% of the Russian army's equipment requirements.

The process of restructuring and rebuilding the army, taking into account current losses in Ukraine, may take Russia several years. Shoigu's announcements about constructing two all-army armies are, undoubtedly, a cause for concern. For the time being, they will make do with vehicles that are demobilised. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the urgency of expanding one's own forces, especially as the Kremlin openly harbours major power aspirations and poses threats to the Baltic states and Poland.