Russian warfare: Capturing ruins, not cities

The Russians aren't capturing cities and villages but rather ruins. This stems from the doctrine they have adopted in conducting warfare. In it, artillery plays the main role, reducing entire city blocks to rubble.

When the Russians captured Grozny after several assaults during the first battle for the city, analysts compared the intensity of the fighting to that fought by the Soviets in Berlin in the spring of 1945. The effects of the battles were similar – artillery destroyed almost half of the urban structures, nearly levelling the centre completely.

Almost 80 years have passed since the capture of Berlin. Almost 30 since the seizure of Grozny. Russian tactics for capturing cities have hardly changed. The most glaring examples in recent years have been Mariupol, Popasna, and Bakhmut.

The three-month siege of Mariupol and the urban fighting that took place turned the city of nearly half a million into a sea of ruins. The aggressors systematically shelled and bombarded the city, not caring where the shells landed. The Drama Theatre, under which children were hiding, the maternity hospital, and the schools were levelled.

About 140,000 civilians were still in the city at the time of its capitulation, whom the Russians had not previously allowed to leave, blocking humanitarian corridors. There was a lack of water and food. There was no electricity or heating. This is not surprising. The city was destroyed by about 90%.

The same happened to Popasna, which was destroyed to a comparable degree, or Irpin and Izium, where three-quarters of the buildings were destroyed or damaged. This state of affairs is due to two issues. Firstly, the Russians prioritise capturing the city above all else. The condition of the prize doesn't matter. What is more important is the name that will appear in the communiqué.

Secondly, the Russians still have not learnt how to fight in urban areas. They operate in small groups, which are quickly surrounded and eliminated. Airborne units and reconnaissance companies are particularly shattered. Both communication and operational awareness of commanders fail. There is a lack of unmanned reconnaissance equipment. The Russians are operating blindly, and groups composed mainly of conscripts are quickly eliminated by Ukrainians.

Therefore, they must adapt tactics to their skills and possibilities. Since skills are minimal, they try to win through capabilities, that is, mass and artillery strength.

For almost three years, the Russians have been attacking like during World War I. First, the artillery prepares by shelling Ukrainian positions, then infantry moves in with the support of light vehicles or infantry fighting vehicles.

While initially able to capture towns quickly, it's not so straightforward now. Russian reservists were not trained at all for urban combat, and contract soldiers had very limited training. They are gaining it in battle.

Kremlin generals love exercises on open ground. Even during the maneuvers preceding the attack on Ukraine, they practised troop movements, bridge constructions, and attacking positions. Nothing that would be useful in urban combat.

Therefore, when infantry stalled around Izium, Popasna, and later around Bakhmut and Avdiivka, the burden of the fight was taken over by artillery, and the infantry simply had to occupy the ruins.

In this area, the Russians have an overwhelming advantage. It's not so much technological as it is in numbers. Russian artillery still primarily uses classical ammunition, the production of which does not require advanced technologies. However, to achieve a similar accuracy effect as Ukrainians, they have to fire significantly more shells.

But this doesn't matter to them given their adopted tactics. Before entering a locality, artillery rains down a barrage of shells, levelling buildings, and the infantry merely has to clean up and occupy the ruined terrain. This is currently visible during attempts to capture Vuhledar and Pokrovsk. Dozens of artillery shells fall on both cities daily. At the peak intensity of the battles, it was over 26,000 shells.

In two days, the Russians almost closed the encirclement around the fortress-city, which had been a symbol of resistance and the site of their numerous defeats over the past years. Now they are regularly bombing it with artillery fire and burning it using incendiary ammunition, driving out the remnants of defenders from the legendary 72nd Independent Mechanised Brigade, which had been holding the section for over two years and effectively defending it.

The Russians will certainly capture the city or rather what remains of it. What matters is not that capturing Vuhledar would open up the road and railway line connecting Donetsk with Volnovakha, greatly facilitating logistics work. More important at this moment is the symbol. And the symbol is the name, even though they will enter only the ruins of the city and three mines.

Pokrovsk is also turning into a sea of ruins. If urban fighting occurs, it may be even fiercer than in Bakhmut. The problem is that Ukrainians do not fare very well in urban combat, where they lose their technical advantage, while Russians win through mass. Unfortunately, mass flattens cities like a steamroller.