NATO's thin Baltic shield: Urgent push for naval build-up
"We want to strengthen the Baltic militarily," stated Donald Tusk, summarising his conversation with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Despite Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Russian threat has not been neutralised, and the naval forces of NATO fleets remain insufficient. What capabilities does NATO have in the Baltic?
The Baltic Sea is a theatre of hybrid activities—hostile actions carried out by China and Russia against NATO countries in such a way that clearly identifying the perpetrators is difficult, and causing harm to the West occurs below the threshold set by open, "kinetic" war.
Such activities include GPS signal disruptions and repeated attacks on underwater infrastructure using civilian ships. DropThese ships dropir anchors in the right place and dragdragm across the seabed cau, damaging pipelines and underwater cables.
Although on 26 December 2024, Finland was able to quickly respond to the damage to telecommunications cables and stopped the perpetrator of such actions—the ship Eagle S flying the Cook Islands flag—it is worth remembering that this was a reaction to already inflicted damage. Eagle S managed to damage telecommunications cables and the EstLink 2 power connection between Finland and Estonia.
NATO naval forces in the Baltic
NATO's naval forces in the Baltic are limited, and NATO fleets are still waiting for real reinforcement.
Theoretically, Germany's strongest navy has six Type 212A submarines, five corvettes, and as many as 11 frigates at its disposal. However, it is worth remembering that Germany's largest and most modern ships—four Baden-Württemberg-class frigates—were designed for asymmetric conflicts and expeditionary operations. Moreover, Germany must divide its fleet between two bodies of water—the Baltic Sea and the North Sea.
The Polish Navy currently consists of two old Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, one submarine ORP "Orzeł," and the "patrol corvette" ORP "Ślązak," a ship that, after 18 years of construction, turned out to be under-armed and practically incapable of combat (which, according to the Ministry of National Defence, is to change).
Three Project 660M missile ships (Orkan-class) armed with Swedish RBS15 anti-ship missiles currently provide the capability to combat enemy surface ships. These small vessels, with a displacement of around 390 tonnes, lack anti-aircraft or anti-submarine capabilities, and their ability to operate in challenging conditions is very limited.
The Swedish Navy has only seven small corvettes, of which the five largest and most modern—Visby-class vessels—have a displacement of just 670 tonnes. Sweden's four submarines include one older type and three A19 types. The attempt to replace them with modern A26 Blekinge-class units is delayed by many years.
The Finnish Navy also has a small potential, consisting of only eight small missile boats with a displacement of 280 tonnes.
In practice, this means that NATO countries on the Baltic—aside from Germany and to a very limited extent Poland—do not have, for example, the capability for consistent, weather-independent control of the Baltic. They also lack the ability to effectively detect and potentially combat Russian submarines since land-based aircraft or helicopters cannot fully replace a large ship capable of operating in all weather conditions.
Meanwhile, Russia can freely reinforce its Baltic Fleet during peacetime and deploy it from ports before commencing military actions. Furthermore, in the event of blocked access to the Baltic through the Danish straits, it can reinforce it by moving smaller ships through inland waters.
However, experts point to submarines, including those capable of launching cruise missiles from underwater like some Project 636.3 submarines, as its most dangerous component.
The Baltic is not NATO's "lake"
This is important, especially in the context of the belief expressed by politicians, among others, that after Finland and Sweden joined NATO, the Baltic became an internal NATO "lake" to which the Russian Baltic Fleet would not have access.
Nothing could be further from the truth, as explained in detail by Commander Tomasz Witkiewicz in response to similar statements.
New large ships needed in the Baltic
These weaknesses have been identified, and Poland, Sweden, and Finland are working to expand their fleets with large ships that possess significant anti-aircraft capabilities and can conduct or support ASW (anti-submarine warfare) operations.
In Poland’s case, this is the Miecznik programme, which aims to acquire at least three frigates (as well as the more distant Murena programme). Sweden is building four large Lulea-class corvettes, and Finland is constructing four Pohjanmaa-class ships—called corvettes but with a displacement larger than Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates.
The entry of these units into service—along with Poland's Orka programme—will positively impact the balance of forces in the Baltic, but in the best-case scenario, the situation will not begin to change until the end of the decade.
